Text 3991, 490 rader
Skriven 2006-07-16 12:44:00 av Robert E Starr JR (4464.babylon5)
Ärende: Re: Atheists: America's m
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"Josh Hill" <usereplyto@gmail.com> wrote in message
news:ogejb25mnq66gdc38oftc09spvgirncjbr@4ax.com...
> On Sat, 15 Jul 2006 15:00:30 -0500, "Carl" <cengman7@hotmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>>
>>"Josh Hill" <usereplyto@gmail.com> wrote in message
>>news:hpjgb2t0q37gmofuis9ffk9vgergdua653@4ax.com...
>
>>>>> And, you know, some people get upset at the prospect of being without
>>>>> purpose or meaning, but I haven't found that it makes any difference:
>>>>> there's still good and bad, there are still things to be done, whether
>>>>> I view myself as a child of God or a dance of energy-absorbing
>>>>> molecules.
>>>>
>>>>I never said that purpose or meaning has to be external.  An athiest
>>>>(back to the original topic!) might still consider themselves as having
>>>>a purpose...as defined by themself.
>>>
>>> But I think that's substantially different than a purpose that arises
>>> from the nature of things.
>>
>>It's easy to argue that whatever you do *is* natural.
>
> True, but then everything is natural in that sense. In practice, I
> don't think anyone would define computers or Silly Putty as "natural"

One could argue that the process of humans making tools is natural.
Beavers make dams, people make dams.  We just do it ona bigger scale.
Dolpins "play"...so do people, we invent things like Silly Putty as a tool
to
help us play.

<snipping just because this is getting long>

>
>>> Personal philosophy: I don't pick fights with strangers.
>>
>>Nope, that's a statement of fact, not a philosphy since the original
>>assertion was that Philosphy asks "Why?"
>>This is more of a statement of fact.
>
>>> Erroneous objective philosophy: If I pick fights with strangers, I get
>>> creamed.
>>
>>>
>>> Correct objective philosophy: If I pick fights with strangers, it's
>>> likely that I'll be creamed.
>>
>>In my mind, none of these questions are actually philosophical questions.
>>"Why shouldn't I pick fights (whether I win or lose)?" would be a good
>>philosophical question.
>>
>>Declaring oneself a conscientious objector to a war is a personal
>>philosophical statement.
>
> I think you're sort of hoisted by your own petard here, because that's
> a statement of fact -- I object morally to war -- rather than a
> question of why. Indeed, it's very much akin to my "I don't pick
> fights with strangers," which I intended as a statement of principle.


Not quite; it says "I will not serve in the war.  Why? Because it
goes against my moral code (personal philosphy), and therefore
my conscience."

>
>> If a person objects to a particular war (Iraq) but
>>accpets the reasons for another (WW II) then it is a personal philosphy,
>>but
>>in coming to that conclusion, a person should honestly be considering the
>>larger philosophical concepts ... pacifism as a philosophy of
>>exceptionless
>>non-violence towards others, for instance.  Again, the personal and
>>"larger"
>>philosphies are not distinct.  I think that they are actually unavoidably
>>linked.
>
> But linkage isn't identity. If it were, one could argue that the
> subjective is objective -- I certainly would, since I consider thought
> a natural phenomenon -- and that there is therefore no distinction
> between the two.

I never argued that personal = higher philosphy, only that they aren't 
completely separate and that personal philosphy can be just as earnest
an attempt to come to the "Truth" as higher philosphy.

> So while I agree that our personal philosophies embody objective
> elements, or at least claim to, it seems to me that in the practical
> sense of the word they embody subjective elements as well, in that
> they represent the state of our own thought and, not infrequently,
> beliefs and emotional tendencies that are not arrived at through a
> rational philosophical process, or that subvert that process.

All philosphy has subjective elements.


>>>>Trying to define morals strictly within the bounds of logic is a little
>>>>like
>>>>trying to describe sex to a child using pictures in a book.
>>>
>>> To be sure, but are subjective impressions part of philosophy, or
>>> something that's examined by philosophy?
>>
>>If there is no God, then there is no higher philosophy; all of the "Whys"
>>become personal and as such they are all subjective because there are no
>>absolutes to the question of "Why?"
>
> I'll have to disagree vociferously on that one! God doesn't answer
> "why" -- she merely postpones it. Because if the reason we do things
> and things are the way they are is God, why God?

God answers the Why ("Because God wishes it") an d in doing so provides a 
moral absolute. Without that, "Good" and "Evil" must be subjective.  For the 
sake of this paragraph, let's assume there is a God.  In that case, a 
personal or group interpretation of what God wishes may be wrong, but there 
is still an absolute True (or "Good") by which to measure it against. 
Granted, actually knowing whether yourinterpretation of moral andimmoral is 
accurate is unknowable until after death, but so what?  As with most things 
in life, you pay your dues and you give it your best shot.

>
> I'm reminded of the story of the old lady and the philosopher.
>
> "The world is held up by a giant turtle!", the old lady said.
>
> The philosopher gave her a patronizing smile. "If the world is held up
> by a giant turtle, what holds up the giant turtle?"
>
> "You can't fool /me,/" said the old lady. "It's turtles all the way
> down!"
>
> That being said, it seems to me that "why" can as easily be "why not"?

"Why not?" Is the same question.  The answer can be stated as a negative 
too.

> That seems to be the universe's attitude, insofar as it can be said to
> have one: all possible mathematical outcomes occur simultaneously.

Without a God or underlying intelligence taht one can call God, attributing 
an attitude is simply anthropomorphism.  Without an underling intelligence, 
there is no absolute good or moral and everything is personally subjective. 
The universe doesn't "care" if there's life or not.  IKf it's there, fine. 
If not, so?

<snip...again, only for length>

>>>>
>>>>You can certainly use science to provide evidence of consequences... but
>>>>morality judges whether those consequences are good or bad ones.
>>>
>>> Why can't science examine what makes those consequences good or bad?
>>
>>Because I don't think science can't define what's "good" and "bad," which
>>gets back to my original
>>comment that science can't answer the philosphical question "Why?"
>
> Are you so sure that it can't define good and bad? Perhaps what you
> mean to say is that it can't divide things into both because they're
> to some extent contingent? There's a famous short story, forget its
> name and will no doubt get some of the details wrong, in which people
> in an isolated interstellar colony practice cannibalism. And at the
> end of the story you learn that the cannibalism is /morally right,/
> that it's considered an honor to be eaten because given the limited
> resources of the planet, the people in that colony couldn't have
> survived without it.

For the sake of this paragraph, let's assume there is no God.  You can't 
determine (other than at a personal level) that cannabilsm in ANY context is 
morally right or wrong without resorting to majority rules.   There is no 
absolute good or bad to judge against....so it's all subjective.

>
>>> It seems to me that both psychology and neuroscience have done that,
>>> as more recently has evolutionary biology and even mathematics.
>>
>>Neither biology or mathematics address the question.
>>
>>If I kill someone...how does mathematics define that act as good or bad?
>>Eventually you get to a point that somewhere in the "equation" you have
>>some
>>kind of subjective element in order to determine that the outcome is good
>>or
>>bad... in which case you might as well chuck the math.
>
> Not necessarily. Because we can benefit from a well-developed moral
> calculus, from understanding why we do things and what we should do to
> achieve a moral goal.

Understanding why we do things does nothing to establish whether what we do 
is good or bad or whether the goal is moral; it just helps us to determjine 
whether the person is well intentioned.  There's a big difference.

< And at some point in our understanding, we know
> enough to take a rigorous, mathematical approach to these questions,
> to make it hard science.

Unless you can come up with a rigorous, mathematical, scientific definition 
of moral (which I don't believe that you can), the rest of the equation is 
simply increasingly precise scalars of the things that youcasn quantify... 
until you get the variable z=whatever subjective moral value you've 
rationalized.

>
> We're currently a bit short of that, of course, but not by that much,
> because we're beginning to model basic evolutionary processes on
> computers, and I believe that the structures that evolve already
> develop and exhibit both altruistic and competitive behaviors. At a
> somewhat less basic level, evolutionary biology now sees these
> behaviors in terms of the propagation of DNA: individuals are more apt
> to help close relatives, say, than strangers because in helping the
> relatives they increase the probability that their DNA will be passed
> on. And there are circumstances in which amoral behaviors -- stealing
> some food when the other monkey looks the other way, say -- have the
> same effect of increasing the probability that one's DNA will be
> transmitted. So I'd say it's only a matter of time before we have a
> fairly rigorous, mathematical understanding of the basic principles
> involved.

You're starting with the arbitrary moral that life and evolution are "good." 
That's a common and very helpful one to start with, but if there was no life 
on Earth, would the univere care?  If there were an arbitrary number of 
beings on the planet that were generally happy and never aged or died, would 
they care about evolution?

Unless you can prove the answer is yes, it's a common personal philosophy.

<more editing for space>

>>> It can even recognize that some acts are moral and some amoral within
>>> a given context and aid in the refinement of moral strictures and
>>> judgment, by for example refining the primitive incest taboos into
>>> modern ones based on a knowledge of genetics.
>>
>>I don't think so.  Even the simple act of defining a moral constant in an
>>equation (moral = 1, amoral = 0; immoral = -1) implies that you can also
>>define the constant to any act or philosphical question... and that is
>>completely subjective.
>
> Why do you suppose that the equation is a Boolean one?

Look again, the example was trinary. :)


> I'd say we're
> talking statistics here at the very least, e.g., with current
> technology, we can only predict the probability that marrying one's
> first cousin will produce an idiot. There may be a subjective or
> arbitrary /element/ in our decision because where we don't have
> sufficient data to make a perfect one, but there is also an objective
> element.

The only objective element is the odds of the outcome.  Everything else
is completely subjective.

> A hypothetical future society might be able to pick or modify the
> genes of both parents in such as way as to cull unfortunate
> recessives. What is in most circumstances an objectively immoral act
> for us* might then become an objectively moral act for them.

Nope.  The very nature of it being immoral for us and moral for them makes
it subjective.


> *I say most because in some cases it clearly would not be: forex, when
> a breeding population is very small, as it might be after a massive
> disaster, inbreeding helps conserve genetic diversity

So?

>>> But by the same token,
>>> science recognizes that moral systems are at least to some extent
>>> contingent, personal, and arbitrary. It can suggest changes only
>>> within the context of externally-supplied parameters.

And there you have it.  "z"  .. the fudge factor that science can't deal 
with. Morals are outiside of the bounds of science and strictly in the 
domain
of philosphy.

The best science can do with morals is measure commonality of morals between 
people (x % of people believe killing in this circumstance is immoral)... 
but that is completely different than saying that science can define what is 
moral.


>>
>>Exactly!  I think you just came around to my way of thinking on this
>>issue!
>>My original assertion was that science could not answer a certain
>>question... Why... which is the domain of philosophy.  Philosphy deals
>>with
>>moral questions.  Good and bad are defined in the context of philosphy.
>
> Heh, no -- I don't think philosophy can answer "why" any more than
> science can.

No...but hopefully it provides a set of frameworks through which  a person 
can choose one they identify with and it will help guide them through the 
logical consequences of that particular philosphy.  If that philosphy 
includes God, then there are  requirements and consequences that are part of 
that philosphy.  If it's existentialism, the higher rules don't exist and 
you make up your own.   Philsophy itself doesn't mandate that there is a 
correct answer; it's the people that adhere to a philosphy that attempt to 
do that.


>Which is to say I don't think it's the right question: as
> I said earlier, the right question seems to be "why not." And that
> understanding is coming from science, not philosophy, in the narrow
> sense in which it's typically construed today.

I think a lot of people would argue with that.

Science may able to map in your brain whether or not you're happy, but 
knowing it wouldn't make you happy.  When the west started down the road of 
Socratic thinking and the rest of the world didn't, there was a big shift in 
technology and science, but that didn't make us happier, better, or more 
moral.  It made us more technologically advanced.   people of many religions 
woudl argue that we're crazy for worshipping at thre alter of science rather 
than trying to focus on "inner" issues.

Understanding science is understanding how the physical universe works. 
That is not at all the same thing as understanding what is moral... or even 
meaningful.  They are different questions.


> Which brings us by a
> commodius vicus of recirculation back to what I said about the fact
> that science was originally considered part of philosophy, and
> probably should be today -- not because science needs to be part of
> philosophy, but because philosophy without science is like a hatchet
> without a head.

Nope.  Take the most primitive tribe.  As a collective they may not care at 
all whether there's a neutrino... or whether it's a collection of conditions 
that cause it to rain of a little purple dwarf named Fred.  They will 
develop some attempt at answering why they're there.  It may be "The Great 
Spirit," "Zeus," "Odin," "Charlton Heston" or whatever... but the 
philosphical questions come first.

Science can (and should) be used to whittle out the obvious flaws (gods 
playing tenpins create thunder), but science can only go so far.  There is a 
leap that bridges "What I know" and "What I believe" because there are some 
things that aren't knowable and some things aren't facts...they're  beliefs 
that define who were are, both individually and culterally.

<snip>

>>Of course asking questions is part of science...but they're different
>>questions. A scientist doesn't start out to prove something is moral; he
>>orshe proves something that can be proved.
>>
>>Likewise, a philospher that tries to provide a proof for their philosphy
>>is
>>equally guilty of fooling themselves... much like St. Anselm and Euler
>>did.
>>Granted, Anselm did better at fooling others...he was canonized for his
>>silly piece of sophistry.
>
> That last is a fairly recent observation in philosophy. That being
> said, I don't know that there's a theoretical argument against it:
> philosophy does deal with the objective, it just isn't always
> rigorous, it isn't always right, and I suspect it can't be complete
> any more than mathematics can.

And science shouldn't deal with the subjective...because once you define a 
subjective premise the outcome is also subjective... and that's not what 
science is for.  Then you start building a house of cards based on 
subjective premises.  No thank you.

Philosophy starts with the subjective as a premise and (hopefully) uses 
logic to build a framework for extending the consequences of the premise to 
take it as far as it can.  If at some point the premise causes a logical 
disconnect or undesirable (to the individual) consequences, either the 
premise is altered or the philosphy is abandoned on the side of the road. 
Happens all the time.

If a person starts with a philosphy of "I should be able to do anyting I 
want... Why? Freedom implies this." Consequence? That same freedom is also 
given to others and then they can do anything they want.  Oh oh... what if 
they do something I don't like?  Alter the premise...repeat cycle.
There really isn't a lot of science in this... (although there is (hopefully 
a lot of logic involved), unless you start to define negative experiences as 
empiricle data... but that's nitpicking a definition.

In this and most philosphies, "moral" is usually inaccurately defined as 
desirable.


<snip>
>>>
>>> Again, I think psychologists have devised many scales. They tend to be
>>> self-centering and normalizing, e.g., "Rate on a scale of 1 to 10 how
>>> much you love your wife and kids, with 1 being not at all and 10 being
>>> extremely."
>>
>>Nope...that doesn't cut it as science.  There's no measure.  If I said 9,
>>9
>>what?   Compared to what?  What possible relative measure could there be.
>>If I asked how far away the moon is and someone said "2.3", what would
>>that
>>mean?  If yiou already knew the distance you determine the measure, but
>>that's cheating.
>
> See below.
>
>>> And then you could ask the same thing about the other questions using
>>> the same scale, and compare them to get an idea of the relative
>>> importance of these things to you. It's crude, but it works.
>>
>>But the results would only apply to that one person (and so are completely
>>subjective).
>
> But that's easily solved by asking the question of a statistically
> valid sample and comparing their responses. This isn't just theory --
> it's done all the time.

Ask 500 people how much they love their wife.  If they all say "A lot," or 
"10" does that mean they all love their wifes the same?  Of course not, and 
because of that, the statistic is meaningless because there is no common 
frame of reference.


>
>>>>>As a physicist, forget which
>>>>> one, once observed, mathematics is formalized thought. It's probably
>>>>> not an overstatement to say that the universe is made up of numbers.
>>>>
>>>>The physical universe can be measured in numbers.
>>>>The consequences of some events can be measured in numbers.
>>>>Many things can't be.
>>>
>>> I believe that insofar as some things can't be measured at all. But
>>> that doesn't include how much you love your wife and kids. Some day,
>>> we will be able to point to the individual neurons and the strength of
>>> the synaptic connections. Even now, we can detect metabolic activity
>>> in areas of the brain that are triggered by love, as well as hormone
>>> levels. And before that, we could ask questions of the sort I
>>> mentioned above. And ultimately, it all comes down to physics and
>>> math.
>>
>>But what you measure isn't reflective of the emotion.  For instance, if
>>you
>>isolated and measured my neural activity when my son had to undergo
>>surgery
>>and then again when I come home from work and find out that he and his
>>sister were fighting you might get the impression that I love my son more
>>when he has surgery when in fact I'm just more acutely aware of my
>>feelings
>>for him when his welfare is threatened.   Likewise, I was not truly aware
>>of
>>how much I cared about my first girlfriend until she died...but if you
>>asked
>>me I would have told you that I was completely in love with her.  Whatever
>>you measure...no matter how you try...isn't going to be accurate.
>
> I think they're a bit more sophisticated at this point, actually: lots
> of research being done on seemingly similar things that light up
> different parts of the brain. And we're still in the stone age as far
> as our understanding goes. The tools keep becoming better, and as they
> do, we move from Freud, the outside observer with a notebook, a couch,
> and some theories about neurons of 100 years ago, to someone who can
> actually watch brain regions and even individual neurons in action,
> and will eventually be able to "grow" a functioning computer model of
> a human brain from the genome. And what a sci fi story that would
> make!

Even if you could isolate and measure "love" by some neural  model. Does 
that even suggest that the numbers would have any meaning?  Would the data 
mean the same thing to someone that had never been in love?

There's a ***huge*** difference between information,  answers, and meaning. 
Science can provide the first  and some of the second; philosphy tries to 
pick up where science leaves off.

Then again, what do I know?

Carl
                                                          
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