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Möte OSDEBATE, 18996 texter
 lista första sista föregående nästa
Text 594, 313 rader
Skriven 2004-09-14 16:37:52 av Rich (1:379/45)
    Kommentar till text 587 av Geo. (1:379/45)
Ärende: Re: Spammers faster than the good guys....
==================================================
From: "Rich" <@>

This is a multi-part message in MIME format.

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   You didn't even make any attempt to reply to my message.  Try again =
this time explaining why it is beneficial for a spammer to behave as you =
suggest instead of the simpler alternatives that do not require this =
additional liability.

Rich

  "Geo." <georger@nls.net> wrote in message news:41477891@w3.nls.net...
  How do you figure? You think a spammer doesn't have a hundred domains =
that
  can't be tracked back to him?

  Rich, have you (in the past year or two) even tried to track down a =
spammer?

  Ok example, pretend for a minute the MX points to you and you don't =
know the
  owner and track down the bounces from doh@theyscrewedusagain.com and =
that's a
  .COM, you should try it with a .INFO

  Geo.

  "Rich" <@> wrote in message news:4144aa77$1@w3.nls.net...
     Again you make this silly suggestion.  Why would a spammer do =
something like
  this that provides a tracable record that is a legal liability for =
them.  They
  should just as easily have no MX record or an MX record that points to =
an
  invalid IP.  Both of which have the same effect of mail to their =
domain not
  being deliverable which is all you claim they want.  It's one thing to =
create a
  liability by spammer for which they derive revenue.  It's another to =
create one
  which provides liability only.

  Rich

    "Geo." <georger@nls.net> wrote in message =
news:4144a563$1@w3.nls.net...
    "John Beckett" <FirstnameSurname@compuserve.com.omit> wrote in =
message
    news:4144309b.40375046@216.144.1.254...

    > However, no one has given any hint of a reason why SPF won't =
reduce a lot
    > of back-scatter.

    Ok you want it explained, I can do that.

    What is the reason backscatter exists? I mean why don't spammers use =
domains
    from their unlimited supply of domains instead of pretending to be =
from
  mike's
    domain?

    The reason is simple, many email servers have to accept an email for =
delivery
    before they can run a spam filter on it. And for some reason many, =
once they
    run a filter on it and decide it's spam they try to return it to the =
source
    instead of just deleting it.

    Now the spammers want to know if an address doesn't exist so they =
can keep
    their lists up to date, but when a filter blocks spam that tells =
them nothing
    about if the address exists or not so there is no value in accepting =
these
    returns. In fact it's a waste of their bandwidth and cpu to even try =
to deal
    with backscatter.

    So they spam in a way that someone else has to deal with it. Up =
until SPF
  that
    was quite simple, they just use a different domain name for the FROM =
address.

    Ok now along comes SPF, what do you think the spammers are going to =
accept
    their own backscatter now? Hardly, all they are going to do is set =
the SPF
    record for their domain to point to the source of their spam so it's =
accepted
    like before and then set the MX record to point to some mail server =
where
  they
    can dump the backscatter. It's like hardly any extra work for them =
to do this
    and all it costs them is a few DNS queries to DNS servers that are =
probably
    hosted on compromised machines anyway.

    What I'm saying is if SPF reaches a level of acceptance that it =
actually has
  an
    annoyance factor to the spammers, they can make a simple change to =
their
    methods and SPF becomes meaningless as far as a solution for =
backscatter

    Here this is how difficult it is:

    Entries for a domain bytemyshorts.info

    txt record "v=3Dspf1 ip4:1.1.1.1/1 ~all"
    MX records point to
    131.107.3.125
    131.107.3.124
    131.107.3.122
    131.107.3.123
    131.107.3.126
    131.107.3.121

    Ok I just defined half the planet as a possible source for my spam =
so using
  all
    my compromises hosts will be no problem and all my bounces are going =
back to
    microsoft's mail servers just like I had used an @microsoft.com =
return email
    address.

    I can make the same entries for bytemyshorts1.info
    thru bytemyshorts1000000.info

    Now what protection has SPF provided for Microsoft? All I see is =
that it
    protects the name "microsoft.com". It's a copyright/trademark =
protection
    mechanism for high value domains and not much else. Nobody else can =
use
    microsoft.com but beyond that it provides no significant protection =
of the
    email system.

    Geo.



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<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN">
<HTML><HEAD>
<META http-equiv=3DContent-Type content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Diso-8859-1">
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<BODY bgColor=3D#ffffff>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>&nbsp;&nbsp; You didn't even make any =
attempt to=20
reply to my message.&nbsp; Try again this time explaining why it is =
beneficial=20
for a spammer to behave as you suggest instead of the simpler = alternatives
that=20
do not require this additional liability.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2></FONT>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>Rich</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2></FONT>&nbsp;</DIV>
<BLOCKQUOTE=20
style=3D"PADDING-RIGHT: 0px; PADDING-LEFT: 5px; MARGIN-LEFT: 5px; =
BORDER-LEFT: #000000 2px solid; MARGIN-RIGHT: 0px">
  <DIV>"Geo." &lt;<A =
href=3D"mailto:georger@nls.net">georger@nls.net</A>&gt; wrote=20
  in message <A=20
  =
href=3D"news:41477891@w3.nls.net">news:41477891@w3.nls.net</A>...</DIV>Ho=
w do=20
  you figure? You think a spammer doesn't have a hundred domains =
that<BR>can't=20
  be tracked back to him?<BR><BR>Rich, have you (in the past year or =
two) even=20
  tried to track down a spammer?<BR><BR>Ok example, pretend for a minute =
the MX=20
  points to you and you don't know the<BR>owner and track down the =
bounces from=20
  <A =
href=3D"mailto:doh@theyscrewedusagain.com">doh@theyscrewedusagain.com</A>=
 and=20
  that's a<BR>.COM, you should try it with a =
.INFO<BR><BR>Geo.<BR><BR>"Rich"=20
  &lt;@&gt; wrote in message <A=20
  =
href=3D"news:4144aa77$1@w3.nls.net">news:4144aa77$1@w3.nls.net</A>...<BR>=
&nbsp;&nbsp;=20
  Again you make this silly suggestion.&nbsp; Why would a spammer do =
something=20
  like<BR>this that provides a tracable record that is a legal liability =
for=20
  them.&nbsp; They<BR>should just as easily have no MX record or an MX =
record=20
  that points to an<BR>invalid IP.&nbsp; Both of which have the same =
effect of=20
  mail to their domain not<BR>being deliverable which is all you claim =
they=20
  want.&nbsp; It's one thing to create a<BR>liability by spammer for =
which they=20
  derive revenue.&nbsp; It's another to create one<BR>which provides =
liability=20
  only.<BR><BR>Rich<BR><BR>&nbsp; "Geo." &lt;<A=20
  href=3D"mailto:georger@nls.net">georger@nls.net</A>&gt; wrote in =
message <A=20
  =
href=3D"news:4144a563$1@w3.nls.net">news:4144a563$1@w3.nls.net</A>...<BR>=
&nbsp;=20
  "John Beckett" &lt;<A=20
  =
href=3D"mailto:FirstnameSurname@compuserve.com.omit">FirstnameSurname@com=
puserve.com.omit</A>&gt;=20
  wrote in message<BR>&nbsp; <A=20
  =
href=3D"news:4144309b.40375046@216.144.1.254">news:4144309b.40375046@216.=
144.1.254</A>...<BR><BR>&nbsp;=20
  &gt; However, no one has given any hint of a reason why SPF won't =
reduce a=20
  lot<BR>&nbsp; &gt; of back-scatter.<BR><BR>&nbsp; Ok you want it =
explained, I=20
  can do that.<BR><BR>&nbsp; What is the reason backscatter exists? I =
mean why=20
  don't spammers use domains<BR>&nbsp; from their unlimited supply of =
domains=20
  instead of pretending to be from<BR>mike's<BR>&nbsp; =
domain?<BR><BR>&nbsp; The=20
  reason is simple, many email servers have to accept an email for=20
  delivery<BR>&nbsp; before they can run a spam filter on it. And for =
some=20
  reason many, once they<BR>&nbsp; run a filter on it and decide it's =
spam they=20
  try to return it to the source<BR>&nbsp; instead of just deleting=20
  it.<BR><BR>&nbsp; Now the spammers want to know if an address doesn't =
exist so=20
  they can keep<BR>&nbsp; their lists up to date, but when a filter =
blocks spam=20
  that tells them nothing<BR>&nbsp; about if the address exists or not =
so there=20
  is no value in accepting these<BR>&nbsp; returns. In fact it's a waste =
of=20
  their bandwidth and cpu to even try to deal<BR>&nbsp; with=20
  backscatter.<BR><BR>&nbsp; So they spam in a way that someone else has =
to deal=20
  with it. Up until SPF<BR>that<BR>&nbsp; was quite simple, they just =
use a=20
  different domain name for the FROM address.<BR><BR>&nbsp; Ok now along =
comes=20
  SPF, what do you think the spammers are going to accept<BR>&nbsp; =
their own=20
  backscatter now? Hardly, all they are going to do is set the =
SPF<BR>&nbsp;=20
  record for their domain to point to the source of their spam so it's=20
  accepted<BR>&nbsp; like before and then set the MX record to point to =
some=20
  mail server where<BR>they<BR>&nbsp; can dump the backscatter. It's =
like hardly=20
  any extra work for them to do this<BR>&nbsp; and all it costs them is =
a few=20
  DNS queries to DNS servers that are probably<BR>&nbsp; hosted on =
compromised=20
  machines anyway.<BR><BR>&nbsp; What I'm saying is if SPF reaches a =
level of=20
  acceptance that it actually has<BR>an<BR>&nbsp; annoyance factor to =
the=20
  spammers, they can make a simple change to their<BR>&nbsp; methods and =
SPF=20
  becomes meaningless as far as a solution for backscatter<BR><BR>&nbsp; =
Here=20
  this is how difficult it is:<BR><BR>&nbsp; Entries for a domain=20
  bytemyshorts.info<BR><BR>&nbsp; txt record "v=3Dspf1 ip4:1.1.1.1/1=20
  ~all"<BR>&nbsp; MX records point to<BR>&nbsp; 131.107.3.125<BR>&nbsp;=20
  131.107.3.124<BR>&nbsp; 131.107.3.122<BR>&nbsp; =
131.107.3.123<BR>&nbsp;=20
  131.107.3.126<BR>&nbsp; 131.107.3.121<BR><BR>&nbsp; Ok I just defined =
half the=20
  planet as a possible source for my spam so using<BR>all<BR>&nbsp; my=20
  compromises hosts will be no problem and all my bounces are going back =

  to<BR>&nbsp; microsoft's mail servers just like I had used an =
@microsoft.com=20
  return email<BR>&nbsp; address.<BR><BR>&nbsp; I can make the same =
entries for=20
  bytemyshorts1.info<BR>&nbsp; thru =
bytemyshorts1000000.info<BR><BR>&nbsp; Now=20
  what protection has SPF provided for Microsoft? All I see is that =
it<BR>&nbsp;=20
  protects the name "microsoft.com". It's a copyright/trademark=20
  protection<BR>&nbsp; mechanism for high value domains and not much =
else.=20
  Nobody else can use<BR>&nbsp; microsoft.com but beyond that it =
provides no=20
  significant protection of the<BR>&nbsp; email system.<BR><BR>&nbsp;=20
  Geo.<BR><BR><BR></BLOCKQUOTE></BODY></HTML>

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