Text 3981, 448 rader
Skriven 2006-07-16 11:43:00 av Robert E Starr JR (4454.babylon5)
Ärende: Re: Atheists: America's m
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* * * This message was from Josh Hill to rec.arts.sf.tv.babylon5.m * * *
         * * * and has been forwarded to you by Lord Time * * *         
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On Sat, 15 Jul 2006 15:00:30 -0500, "Carl" <cengman7@hotmail.com>
wrote:

>
>"Josh Hill" <usereplyto@gmail.com> wrote in message 
>news:hpjgb2t0q37gmofuis9ffk9vgergdua653@4ax.com...

>>>> And, you know, some people get upset at the prospect of being without
>>>> purpose or meaning, but I haven't found that it makes any difference:
>>>> there's still good and bad, there are still things to be done, whether
>>>> I view myself as a child of God or a dance of energy-absorbing
>>>> molecules.
>>>
>>>I never said that purpose or meaning has to be external.  An athiest
>>>(back to the original topic!) might still consider themselves as having
>>>a purpose...as defined by themself.
>>
>> But I think that's substantially different than a purpose that arises
>> from the nature of things.
>
>It's easy to argue that whatever you do *is* natural.

True, but then everything is natural in that sense. In practice, I
don't think anyone would define computers or Silly Putty as "natural"
.. . . 

>>>>>Science is the Latin word for knowledge.  Knowledge isn't philosphy,
>>>>>although unless you're an idealogue it will certainly play a major part.
>>>>>Unless you're brainwashed, people have each have an individual 
>>>>>philosophy.
>>>>>Science isn't that subjective.
>>>>
>>>> I think there's a substantial difference between the term "a
>>>> philosophy" and "philosophy." True philosophy seeks -- at least, did
>>>> before the post-modernists -- objectivity. It seeks to answer natural
>>>> and moral questions in a logically rigorous way. By way of contrast,
>>>> an individual philosophy implies the subjectivism of imperfect and
>>>> incomplete knowledge.
>>>
>>>A person may strive to have a completely objective view of their own life
>>>and the context in which it is lived.  Consider the song by Kansas...
>>>"Dust in the wind" may be considered a rather objective perspective 
>>>towards
>>>a particular philosophy. The fact that an individual subscribes to such a
>>>philosophy does not negate its objectivity or diminish its validity as
>>>philosophy.
>>>
>>>I see no reason to suggest that "True philosphy" is not subjective through
>>>imperfect and incomplete knowledge.
>>
>> Neither do I, but I think it's nevertheless distinguishable from a
>> personal philosophy, because it seeks to uncover truth.
>
>I think anyone honestly asking the "Why" questions can't develop an answer 
>that is limited to themself; it must also include everyone and so I think 
>there isn't any real distinction.  Even with the "Dust in the Wind" ...which 
>as I recall is Paul's belief... I doubt that Paul would argue that his 
>philosphy is that only *he* will be dust and everyone else may have a 
>different fate after death.  I don't see how you can separate the two as 
>distinctly as you seem to want to.

Obnoxious intellectual arrogance?

Seriously, I think we both agree that we sometimes believe things for
emotional reasons. And when we do that, we sometimes let the tail wag
the dog, in that we sift evidence and fabricate theories to support
our emotional belief.

I discovered years ago that my search for the objective criteria that
I believed underlay my personal moral philosophy had failed, not
because other moral philosophies were right, but because they were all
contingent. And I realized then that it didn't make all that much of a
difference to the way I managed my life: in the absence of an
objective reason to be different, I went on acting as I did.

At the same time, I recognized that there were objective components to
what I did. For example, one can argue objectively whether Bill Gates
has violated the law, and about the effects of his actions on society.
What one can't argue objectively is whether one admires Bill Gates. If
you decide that Bill Gates is a tough competitor who plays hardball,
and you like competitors who play hardball, you'll likely admire him.
If you dislike competitors who play hardball, you won't. At that point
it becomes personal, although I don't think we always recognize when
that point has been crossed.

>> Personal philosophy: I don't pick fights with strangers.
>
>Nope, that's a statement of fact, not a philosphy since the original 
>assertion was that Philosphy asks "Why?"
>This is more of a statement of fact.

>> Erroneous objective philosophy: If I pick fights with strangers, I get
>> creamed.
>
>>
>> Correct objective philosophy: If I pick fights with strangers, it's
>> likely that I'll be creamed.
>
>In my mind, none of these questions are actually philosophical questions. 
>"Why shouldn't I pick fights (whether I win or lose)?" would be a good 
>philosophical question.
>
>Declaring oneself a conscientious objector to a war is a personal 
>philosophical statement.

I think you're sort of hoisted by your own petard here, because that's
a statement of fact -- I object morally to war -- rather than a
question of why. Indeed, it's very much akin to my "I don't pick
fights with strangers," which I intended as a statement of principle.

> If a person objects to a particular war (Iraq) but 
>accpets the reasons for another (WW II) then it is a personal philosphy, but 
>in coming to that conclusion, a person should honestly be considering the 
>larger philosophical concepts ... pacifism as a philosophy of exceptionless 
>non-violence towards others, for instance.  Again, the personal and "larger" 
>philosphies are not distinct.  I think that they are actually unavoidably 
>linked.

But linkage isn't identity. If it were, one could argue that the
subjective is objective -- I certainly would, since I consider thought
a natural phenomenon -- and that there is therefore no distinction
between the two.

So while I agree that our personal philosophies embody objective
elements, or at least claim to, it seems to me that in the practical
sense of the word they embody subjective elements as well, in that
they represent the state of our own thought and, not infrequently,
beliefs and emotional tendencies that are not arrived at through a
rational philosophical process, or that subvert that process.

>>>Trying to define morals strictly within the bounds of logic is a little 
>>>like
>>>trying to describe sex to a child using pictures in a book.
>>
>> To be sure, but are subjective impressions part of philosophy, or
>> something that's examined by philosophy?
>
>If there is no God, then there is no higher philosophy; all of the "Whys" 
>become personal and as such they are all subjective because there are no 
>absolutes to the question of "Why?"

I'll have to disagree vociferously on that one! God doesn't answer
"why" -- she merely postpones it. Because if the reason we do things
and things are the way they are is God, why God?

I'm reminded of the story of the old lady and the philosopher.

"The world is held up by a giant turtle!", the old lady said.

The philosopher gave her a patronizing smile. "If the world is held up
by a giant turtle, what holds up the giant turtle?"

"You can't fool /me,/" said the old lady. "It's turtles all the way
down!"

That being said, it seems to me that "why" can as easily be "why not"?
That seems to be the universe's attitude, insofar as it can be said to
have one: all possible mathematical outcomes occur simultaneously.
That's enough to make something out of nothing. Indeed, the something
/has/ to come out of nothing, because from the perspective of one
/part/ of nothing, something has to exist. (Sounds a bit new-agey, but
it's in fact about as far from that as you can get.)

>>>>>Science can't answer why you should be nice to the person you meet on 
>>>>>the
>>>>>street that you're unlikely to ever see again.
>>>>
>>>> Two questions: Should you?
>>>
>>>That's a moral question and relates to the definition of philosphy as "A
>>>system of values by which one lives."  It's certainly possible to 
>>>construct
>>>a scenerio in which one's actions may be logical but not moral, or 
>>>illogical
>>>and moral.
>>
>> I don't think I recognize that definition. Philosophy is a lot broader
>> than that. Ethics or moral philosophy might be closer.
>
>It's one definition (check Dictionary.com). :)
>
>>
>> Agree with the second point.
>>
>>>> And can't it?
>>>
>>>You can certainly use science to provide evidence of consequences... but
>>>morality judges whether those consequences are good or bad ones.
>>
>> Why can't science examine what makes those consequences good or bad?
>
>Because I don't think science can't define what's "good" and "bad," which 
>gets back to my original
>comment that science can't answer the philosphical question "Why?"

Are you so sure that it can't define good and bad? Perhaps what you
mean to say is that it can't divide things into both because they're
to some extent contingent? There's a famous short story, forget its
name and will no doubt get some of the details wrong, in which people
in an isolated interstellar colony practice cannibalism. And at the
end of the story you learn that the cannibalism is /morally right,/
that it's considered an honor to be eaten because given the limited
resources of the planet, the people in that colony couldn't have
survived without it.

>> It seems to me that both psychology and neuroscience have done that,
>> as more recently has evolutionary biology and even mathematics.
>
>Neither biology or mathematics address the question.
>
>If I kill someone...how does mathematics define that act as good or bad? 
>Eventually you get to a point that somewhere in the "equation" you have some 
>kind of subjective element in order to determine that the outcome is good or 
>bad... in which case you might as well chuck the math.

Not necessarily. Because we can benefit from a well-developed moral
calculus, from understanding why we do things and what we should do to
achieve a moral goal. And at some point in our understanding, we know
enough to take a rigorous, mathematical approach to these questions,
to make it hard science.

We're currently a bit short of that, of course, but not by that much,
because we're beginning to model basic evolutionary processes on
computers, and I believe that the structures that evolve already
develop and exhibit both altruistic and competitive behaviors. At a
somewhat less basic level, evolutionary biology now sees these
behaviors in terms of the propagation of DNA: individuals are more apt
to help close relatives, say, than strangers because in helping the
relatives they increase the probability that their DNA will be passed
on. And there are circumstances in which amoral behaviors -- stealing
some food when the other monkey looks the other way, say -- have the
same effect of increasing the probability that one's DNA will be
transmitted. So I'd say it's only a matter of time before we have a
fairly rigorous, mathematical understanding of the basic principles
involved.

>>>> The first seems to me
>>>> uncertain from a philosophical perspective: you take it for granted
>>>> that you should, and philosophers can provide a fairly elegant
>>>> framework for the criteria you would use, but I don't think that
>>>> modern philosophers, or most philosophers after Nietzsche, would take
>>>> it for granted that you should.
>>>
>>>>
>>>>>From a scientific perspective, the problem would in large measure boil
>>>> down to the role of cooperation in evolution.
>>>
>>>Only on a large scale.  Just to clarify, your position is that science is
>>>only capable of answering moral questions on an evolutionary level?
>>
>> I'm not sure what you mean by moral questions. As you point out below,
>> science doesn't attempt to assign moral values. It can tell us where
>> our moral values come from, examine the process whereby we form them.
>
>Sure, but science can't evaluate (or mathematically express) the morals 
>themselves.

There's can't and can't, in the sense of hasn't yet developed the
techniques and it would be theoretically impossible to do so. I'd say
we're talking about the first.

>> It can even recognize that some acts are moral and some amoral within
>> a given context and aid in the refinement of moral strictures and
>> judgment, by for example refining the primitive incest taboos into
>> modern ones based on a knowledge of genetics.
>
>I don't think so.  Even the simple act of defining a moral constant in an 
>equation (moral = 1, amoral = 0; immoral = -1) implies that you can also 
>define the constant to any act or philosphical question... and that is 
>completely subjective.

Why do you suppose that the equation is a Boolean one? I'd say we're
talking statistics here at the very least, e.g., with current
technology, we can only predict the probability that marrying one's
first cousin will produce an idiot. There may be a subjective or
arbitrary /element/ in our decision because where we don't have
sufficient data to make a perfect one, but there is also an objective
element.

A hypothetical future society might be able to pick or modify the
genes of both parents in such as way as to cull unfortunate
recessives. What is in most circumstances an objectively immoral act
for us* might then become an objectively moral act for them.

*I say most because in some cases it clearly would not be: forex, when
a breeding population is very small, as it might be after a massive
disaster, inbreeding helps conserve genetic diversity

>> But by the same token,
>> science recognizes that moral systems are at least to some extent
>> contingent, personal, and arbitrary. It can suggest changes only
>> within the context of externally-supplied parameters.
>
>Exactly!  I think you just came around to my way of thinking on this issue! 
>My original assertion was that science could not answer a certain 
>question... Why... which is the domain of philosophy.  Philosphy deals with 
>moral questions.  Good and bad are defined in the context of philosphy.

Heh, no -- I don't think philosophy can answer "why" any more than
science can. Which is to say I don't think it's the right question: as
I said earlier, the right question seems to be "why not." And that
understanding is coming from science, not philosophy, in the narrow
sense in which it's typically construed today. Which brings us by a
commodius vicus of recirculation back to what I said about the fact
that science was originally considered part of philosophy, and
probably should be today -- not because science needs to be part of
philosophy, but because philosophy without science is like a hatchet
without a head.

>>>If a species (including the homo sapiens) dies out...for any reason... is
>>>that moral or immoral from a scientific perspective?  Nope.  It's simply a
>>>fact.  Science doesn't assign moral values...it simply provides a
>>>rationalization for moral values.
>>
>> Probably true, although I would argue that modern philosophy does the
>> same.
>>
>>>>>  Science can't measure
>>>>>whether I look at my life as being a good or wasted life.
>>>>
>>>> Again, can't it? At the very least, it could ask (and I'm sure
>>>> psychologists have).
>>>
>>>What measurement would science possibly use to quantify how I measure my
>>>life?
>>>Anyone can ask...that doesn't make it science.
>>
>> But asking questions can be a part of science. Psychologists, for
>> example, ask them all the time, and I'm sure they've asked questions
>> about the very phenomenon you describe.
>
>Of course asking questions is part of science...but they're different 
>questions. A scientist doesn't start out to prove something is moral; he or 
>she proves something that can be proved.
>
>Likewise, a philospher that tries to provide a proof for their philosphy is 
>equally guilty of fooling themselves... much like St. Anselm and Euler did. 
>Granted, Anselm did better at fooling others...he was canonized for his 
>silly piece of sophistry.

That last is a fairly recent observation in philosophy. That being
said, I don't know that there's a theoretical argument against it:
philosophy does deal with the objective, it just isn't always
rigorous, it isn't always right, and I suspect it can't be complete
any more than mathematics can.

>>>>> It doesn't matter
>>>>>how much scientific knowledge is accumulated, it won't be able to 
>>>>>address
>>>>>those questions.  If it can't be expressed in numbers, it's not science.
>>>>
>>>> I would argue that philosophy can be expressed in numbers, that
>>>> anything can be expressed in numbers.
>>>
>>>How much... in numbers...do I love my wife & kids?
>>>How much ... in numbers ... do I value the sound of my son laughing?
>>>How much...in numbers... does it matter to me that my kids are growing up 
>>>to
>>>be good people that think for themselves?
>>>How would you measure the things that I've done that I'm proud of and the
>>>things that I've done that I'm not proud of and quantify them?
>>>What scale can you apply to this that has any meaning to me?
>>
>> Again, I think psychologists have devised many scales. They tend to be
>> self-centering and normalizing, e.g., "Rate on a scale of 1 to 10 how
>> much you love your wife and kids, with 1 being not at all and 10 being
>> extremely."
>
>Nope...that doesn't cut it as science.  There's no measure.  If I said 9,  9 
>what?   Compared to what?  What possible relative measure could there be. 
>If I asked how far away the moon is and someone said "2.3", what would that 
>mean?  If yiou already knew the distance you determine the measure, but 
>that's cheating.

See below.

>> And then you could ask the same thing about the other questions using
>> the same scale, and compare them to get an idea of the relative
>> importance of these things to you. It's crude, but it works.
>
>But the results would only apply to that one person (and so are completely 
>subjective).

But that's easily solved by asking the question of a statistically
valid sample and comparing their responses. This isn't just theory --
it's done all the time.

>>>>As a physicist, forget which
>>>> one, once observed, mathematics is formalized thought. It's probably
>>>> not an overstatement to say that the universe is made up of numbers.
>>>
>>>The physical universe can be measured in numbers.
>>>The consequences of some events can be measured in numbers.
>>>Many things can't be.
>>
>> I believe that insofar as some things can't be measured at all. But
>> that doesn't include how much you love your wife and kids. Some day,
>> we will be able to point to the individual neurons and the strength of
>> the synaptic connections. Even now, we can detect metabolic activity
>> in areas of the brain that are triggered by love, as well as hormone
>> levels. And before that, we could ask questions of the sort I
>> mentioned above. And ultimately, it all comes down to physics and
>> math.
>
>But what you measure isn't reflective of the emotion.  For instance, if you 
>isolated and measured my neural activity when my son had to undergo surgery 
>and then again when I come home from work and find out that he and his 
>sister were fighting you might get the impression that I love my son more 
>when he has surgery when in fact I'm just more acutely aware of my feelings 
>for him when his welfare is threatened.   Likewise, I was not truly aware of 
>how much I cared about my first girlfriend until she died...but if you asked 
>me I would have told you that I was completely in love with her.  Whatever 
>you measure...no matter how you try...isn't going to be accurate.

I think they're a bit more sophisticated at this point, actually: lots
of research being done on seemingly similar things that light up
different parts of the brain. And we're still in the stone age as far
as our understanding goes. The tools keep becoming better, and as they
do, we move from Freud, the outside observer with a notebook, a couch,
and some theories about neurons of 100 years ago, to someone who can
actually watch brain regions and even individual neurons in action,
and will eventually be able to "grow" a functioning computer model of
a human brain from the genome. And what a sci fi story that would
make!


-- 
Josh

"I love it when I'm around the country club, and I hear people talking about
the debilitating
effects of a welfare society. At the same time, they leave their kids a
lifetime and beyond
of food stamps. Instead of having a welfare officer, they have a trust officer.
And instead
of food stamps, they have stocks and bonds."

- Warren Buffett
                                                                               
            
--- SBBSecho 2.11-Win32
 * Origin: Time Warp of the Future BBS - Home of League 10 (1:14/400)