Text 20749, 130 rader
Skriven 2006-06-21 09:56:42 av John Hull (1:123/789.0)
     Kommentar till en text av Alan Hess
Ärende: veterans - your opinion
===============================
I do not agree that the problem lies with EITHER the military OR the civilian
leadership.

Both bear some fault, but the same can be said of any war.  A big part of the
problem is that this war is unlike any war we've ever fought, even Vietnam. 
Why?  Because it is essentially a religious war.  It is the Islamic world
against "the infidels" - essentially everybody else in the world who isn't
Muslim.  Nobody, either civilian or military, was prepared for that sort of
thing.

The other part of the blame falls squarely on the media and those like John
Kerry, John Murtha, Nancy Pelosi, et. al., who have poisoned the atmosphere to
the extent that we are having difficulties that needn't be present.  To that
extent, this IS just like Vietnam in that the media and the cut and run left
are severely hampering our ability to prosecute this war on terror in the most
efficient manner.



Alan Hess -> all wrote:
 AH> What do the war veterans here think of this vet's comments?
 AH> *************

 AH>
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/oped/bal-op.officer20jun20,0,2589527.
 AH> story?coll=bal-pe-opinion

 AH>  From the Baltimore Sun
 AH> Military must share blame


 AH> By Erik Swabb

 AH> June 20, 2006

 AH> It is convenient for military leaders to blame civilian officials for
 AH> wars that go south. The armed forces did it after Vietnam, citing
 AH> civilian interference with military decisions.

 AH> In April, a group of retired generals called for the removal of Defense
 AH> Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld. The generals asserted that U.S. forces
 AH> were capable of suppressing the Iraqi insurgency after the invasion -
 AH> they just needed civilian leaders who listened to military advice and
 AH> provided a sufficient number of troops.

 AH> The generals' attacks, however, mask a dirty truth: The military
 AH> deserves its fair share of blame for shortcomings in Iraq. Because of
 AH> the failure of the top military leadership to institutionalize the
 AH> lessons of the Vietnam War, initial U.S. forces in Iraq were not
 AH> prepared to wage counterinsurgency. As a result, we are facing a more
 AH> difficult battle.

 AH> After the Vietnam War, the military's future leaders drew one main
 AH> lesson: Do not fight another war like it. The young officers who served
 AH> there and later rebuilt the military in the 1980s were loath to combat
 AH> insurgencies, which they considered messy, distracting struggles. These
 AH> leaders focused instead on war with the Soviet Union and built the
 AH> world's premier conventional military.

 AH> In the process, however, priceless lessons from Vietnam about
 AH> counterinsurgency warfare were lost. New officers in the 1980s and
 AH> 1990s, who later assumed key leadership positions, did not study
 AH> counterinsurgency. Only the Green Berets retained institutional
 AH> knowledge because of their Special Forces mission.

 AH> Although post-Cold War conflicts such as Somalia and Bosnia should have
 AH> indicated that nonconventional warfare would increase in importance,
 AH> military leaders continued to train for conventional conflicts.
 AH> Consequently, U.S. forces that invaded Iraq in 2003 were ill-prepared
 AH> for counterinsurgency.

 AH> When my Marine unit prepared to deploy to Iraq in September 2004, we
 AH> followed the standard predeployment training at the time. We conducted
 AH> cultural awareness classes and practiced operations such as manning
 AH> checkpoints and searching houses. But this basic training was not
 AH> grounded in a larger understanding of complex counterinsurgency warfare.

 AH> We did not understand certain dynamics at play, such as the notion that
 AH> excessive force protection alienates the populace, reduces intelligence
 AH> and, therefore, makes one less secure. We knew how to raid a house but
 AH> not how to build local relationships and learn where insurgents were
 AH> hiding. We did not know these crucial aspects of counterinsurgency
 AH> because we had never received training about them.

 AH> Some of the most useful "training" that I received was a 15-minute
 AH> conversation with my best friend, who was an intelligence officer in
 AH> another unit. He told me that some Green Berets had recently given him
 AH> some advice. They told him to focus on helping Iraqis, as opposed to
 AH> conducting aggressive patrols and asking accusatory questions about
 AH> insurgents. The Special Forces soldiers promised that intelligence would
 AH> be forthcoming.

 AH> After months of fruitless operations, I decided to try this strategy. It
 AH> worked wonders. Locals told us the locations of weapon caches, roadside
 AH> bombs and insurgent cell leaders that previous units had missed. In
 AH> retrospect, it is unbelievable that I learned more about
 AH> counterinsurgency from a 15-minute conversation than I did from two
 AH> years of military training. I only wish that I had known this strategy
 AH> from the beginning.

 AH> My experience was no doubt repeated throughout the initial wave of U.S.
 AH> deployments for occupation duties. Units with no understanding and
 AH> little training in counterinsurgency deployed to Iraq. Some units
 AH> managed because of sheer professionalism and ingenuity. Others did not.

 AH> In the end, U.S. forces did the best job possible considering their lack
 AH> of training. However, most would agree that a military that had
 AH> incorporated counterinsurgency into its training for the last 25 years
 AH> would have been more successful battling the insurgency in its critical
 AH> early days.

 AH> Regardless of how the Iraq war ends, the senior military leadership
 AH> again will be faced with a decision like the one after the Vietnam War:
 AH> Institutionalize the lessons or say the military will not engage in
 AH> another fight like Iraq again.

 AH> Lest military leaders forget, they do not choose which wars they fight.
 AH> Their civilian leaders do.

 AH> Erik Swabb is a former Marine infantry officer who served in Fallujah
 AH> from September 2004 to March 2005. His e-mail is cswabb9@yahoo.com.

 AH> Copyright + 2006, The Baltimore Sun | Get Sun home delivery

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