Text 11570, 243 rader
Skriven 2009-05-29 09:16:00 av Bob Klahn (1:124/311)
Kommentar till en text av Richard Webb
Ärende: Using What Works
========================
JF>> Reports vary. Former FBI agent Ali Soufan, told a Senate
JF>> Judiciary subcommittee that the use of tougher interrogation
JF>> techniques was "counterproductive". However, former CIA officer,
JF>> John Kiriakou, said in 2007 that 35 seconds of waterboarding caused
JF>> Zubaydah to reveal key intelligence that allowed the U.S. to
JF>> prevent several terrorist attacks.
RW> WOuld agree with that. But, as I said elsewhere, the
RW> questioning imho is quite legitimate. SInce it was done in
RW> the name of the American people we darned sure have a right
RW> to ask whether or not it was truly effective, whether we
RW> were able to stop what was coming in the planning stages,
RW> and the real rpoof in the pudding, whether any trials etc.
RW> are going to result that won't be compromised by the
RW> "enhanced" techniques.
And it didn't do much good.
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Testimony of Ali Soufan
May 13, 2009
...
The issue that I am here to discuss today, interrogation
methods used to question terrorists, is not, and should not
be, a partisan matter. We all share a commitment to using the
best interrogation method possible that serves our national
security interests and fits squarely within the framework of our
nation's principles.
From my experience, and I speak as someone who has personally
interrogated many terrorists and elicited important actionable
intelligence? I strongly believe that it is a mistake to use
what has become known as the "enhanced interrogation
techniques," a position shared by many professional operatives,
including the CIA officers who were present at the initial
phases of the Abu Zubaydah interrogation.
These techniques, from an operational perspective, are
ineffective, slow and unreliable, and as a result harmful to
our efforts to defeat al Qaeda. (This is aside from the
...
And my focus is on the future. I wish to do my part to ensure
that we never again use these harmful, slow, ineffective, and
unreliable techniques instead of the tried, tested, and
successful ones, the ones that are also in sync with our values
and moral character. Only by doing this will we defeat the
terrorists as effectively and quickly as possible.
Most of my professional career has been spent investigating,
studying, and interrogating terrorists. I have had the privilege
of working alongside, and learning from, some of the most
dedicated and talented men and women our nation has? individuals
from the FBI, and other law enforcement, military, and
intelligence agencies. In my capacity as a FBI Agent, I
investigated and supervised highly sensitive and complex
international terrorism cases, including the East Africa
bombings, the USS Cole bombing, and the events surrounding the
attacks of 9/11. I also coordinated both domestic and
international counter-terrorism operations on the Joint
Terrorist Task Force, FBI New York Office.
I personally interrogated many terrorists we have in our
custody and elsewhere, and gained confessions, identified terror
operatives, their funding, details of potential plots, and
information on how al Qaeda operates, along with other
actionable intelligence. Because of these successes, I was the
government's main witness in both of the trials we have had so
far in Guantanamo Bay, the trial of Salim Ahmed Hamdan, a
driver and bodyguard for Osama Bin Laden, and Ali Hamza Al
Bahlul, Bin Laden's propagandist. In addition I am currently
helping the prosecution prepare for upcoming trials of other
detainees held in Guantanamo Bay.
**************************************************************************
...
RW> SO let's ask the folks who were there what they got. LEt's
RW> see concrete proof of the operations they derailed, let's
RW> see who's going to trial. THis the American people have a
RW> right to see, and a right to ask that it be produced. You
RW> might actually be surprised if the proof is brought forth.
RW> Most folks probably don't give a rat's rear end if you
RW> waterboarded a few qaedas, as long as ew really got
RW> something good for it.
**************************************************************************
There are many examples of successful interrogations of
terrorists that have taken place before and after 9/11. Many of
them are classified, but one that is already public and mirrors
the other cases, is the interrogation of al Qaeda terrorist
Nasser Ahmad Nasser al-Bahri, known as Abu Jandal. In the
immediate aftermath of 9/11, together with my partner Special
Agent Robert McFadden, a first-class intelligence operative from
the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS), (which, from my
experience, is one of the classiest agencies I encountered in
the intelligence community), I interrogated Abu Jandal. Through
our interrogation, which was done completely by the book
(including advising him of his rights), we obtained a treasure
trove of highly significant actionable intelligence. For
example, Abu Jandal gave us extensive information on Osama Bin
Laden's terror network, structure, leadership, membership,
security details, facilities, family, communication methods,
travels, training, ammunitions, and weaponry, including a
breakdown of what machine guns, rifles, rocket launchers, and
anti-tank missiles they used. He also provided explicit details
of the 9/11plot operatives, and identified many terrorists who
we later successfully apprehended.
**************************************************************************
...
RW> get something concrete for your trouble <g>. GEt the
RW> location of a nest of Qaeda snakes to kill if nothing else.
**************************************************************************
The information was important for the preparation of the war in
Afghanistan in 2001. It also provided an important background
to the 9/11 Commission report; it provided a foundation for the
trials so far held in Guantanamo Bay; and it also has been
invaluable in helping to capture and identify top al Qaeda
operatives and thus disrupt plots. The approach used in these
successful interrogations can be called the Informed
Interrogation Approach. Until the introduction of the "enhanced"
technique, it was the sole approach used by our military,
intelligence, and law enforcement community.
...
For example, in my first interrogation of the terrorist Abu
Zubaydah, who had strong links to al Qaeda's leaders and who
knew the details of the 9/11 plot before it happened, I asked
him his name. He replied with his alias. I then asked him, "how
about if I call you Hani?" That was the name his mother
nicknamed him as a child. He looked at me in shock, said "ok,"
and we started talking. The Army Field Manual is not about
being nice or soft. It is a knowledge-based approach. It is
about outwitting the detainee by using a combination of
interpersonal, cognitive, and emotional strategies to get the
information needed. If done correctly it's an approach that
works quickly and effectively because it outwits the detainee
using a method that he is not trained, or able, to resist. This
Informed Interrogation Approach is in sharp contrast with the
harsh interrogation approach introduced by outside contractors
and forced upon CIA officials to use. The harsh technique method
doesn't use the knowledge we have of the detainee's history,
mindset, vulnerabilities, or culture, and instead tries to
subjugate the detainee into submission through humiliation and
cruelty. The approach applies a force continuum, each time
...
continue until the detainee's will is broken and he
automatically gives up all information he is presumed to know.
There are many problems with this technique.
A major problem is that it is ineffective. Al Qaeda terrorists
are trained to resist torture. As shocking as these techniques
are to us, the al Qaeda training prepares them for much worse,
the torture they would expect to receive if caught by
dictatorships for example. This is why, as we see from the
recently released Department of Justice memos on interrogation,
the contractors had to keep getting authorization to use harsher
and harsher methods, until they reached waterboarding and then
there was nothing they could do but use that technique again and
again. Abu Zubaydah had to be waterboarded 83 times and Khalid
Shaikh Mohammed 183 times. In a democracy there is a glass
ceiling of harsh techniques the interrogator cannot breach, and
a detainee can eventually call the interrogator's bluff.
In addition the harsh techniques only serves to reinforce what
the detainee has been prepared to expect if captured. This gives
him a greater sense of control and predictability about his
experience, and strengthens his will to resist.
...
As you can see from this timeline, many of the claims made in
the memos about the success of the enhanced techniques are
inaccurate. For example, it is untrue to claim Abu Zubaydah
wasn't cooperating before August 1, 2002. The truth is that we
got actionable intelligence from him in the first hour of
interrogating him.
In addition, simply by putting together dates cited in the
memos with claims made, falsehoods are obvious. For example, it
has been claimed that waterboarding got Abu Zubaydah to give up
information leading to the capture of Jose Padilla. But that
doesn't add up: Waterboarding wasn't approved until 1August 2002
(verbally it was authorized around mid July 2002), and Padilla
was arrested in May 2002.
The same goes for KSM's involvement in 9/11: That was
discovered in April 2002, while waterboarding was not introduced
until almost three months later. It speaks volumes that the
quoted instances of harsh interrogation methods being a success
are false.
Nor can it be said that the harsh techniques were effective,
which is why we had to be called back in repeatedly. As we know
from the memos, the techniques that were apparently introduced
after I left did not appear to work either, which is why the
memos granted authorization for harsher techniques. That
continued for several months right till waterboarding was
introduced, which had to be used 83 times, an indication that
Abu Zubaydah had called the interrogator's bluff knowing the
glass ceiling that existed.
...
It is also important to realize that those behind this
technique are outside contractors with no expertise in
intelligence operations, investigations, terrorism, or al Qaeda.
Nor did the contractors have any experience in the art of
interview and interrogation. One of the contractors told me this
at the time, and this lack of experience has also now been
recently reported on by sources familiar with their backgrounds.
**************************************************************************
There is a whole lot more to this.
www.snipurl.com/terrortestimony
BOB KLAHN bob.klahn@sev.org http://home.toltbbs.com/bobklahn
... Blessed are the meek, for they make great scapegoats.
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