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Ärende: Press Release (0606225) for Thu, 2006 Jun 22
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Press Briefing by National Security Advisor Steve Hadley
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For Immediate Release
Office of the Press Secretary
June 22, 2006

Press Briefing by National Security Advisor Steve Hadley
Best Western Grand Hotel Hungaria
Budapest, Hungary



1:19 P.M. (Local)

MR. SNOW: We're going to do just a quick sort of a joint briefing here.
We've got Steve Hadley and Julie Ansley here to talk about the President's
visits today with the President and Prime Minister of Hungary, and
entertain any other questions of consequence that you may have. Steve, why
don't you come up, and you can give a summary of the morning's meeting.

MR. HADLEY: I'll run through the day, and then talk a little bit about what
was discussed. The President began this morning with an embassy greeting,
meeting with the men and women who support U.S. government activities here.

He then met with the President of Hungary, went to the Parliament Building,
where he met with the Prime Minister. After a meeting with the Prime
Minister, of course, there was a brief meeting with the press. He then met
with the Speaker of the Parliament, and then had an opportunity to greet
various leaders of the political parties here in Hungary. And then there
was a social lunch where the two leaders and the President -- President and
Prime Minister and President Bush made some brief comments.

The two longest substantive meetings were, of course, the meeting with the
President and the Prime Minister. At both of those meetings, the subject of
democracy and freedom came up, of course. This being the 50th anniversary
of the 1956 uprising, freedom and democracy are very much on everybody's
mind. The President paid tribute to the spirit of the Hungarian people that
despite the events of 1956 stood strong and ultimately resulted in the
freedom that Hungary achieved in 1989.

They talked about Hungary could not only be an example to the world about
the power of freedom, but also, in some sense, Hungary can share the
lessons it has learned from its own transition to freedom and democracy
with other countries not only in the region, but around the world. All
three leaders talked about the responsibility of those who know freedom to
support others in their quest for freedom. There are a lot of ways in which
that support can manifest itself, but they all agreed that it is the
responsibility of those who are free to help those who would be free.

There was a discussion of issues of the day. President noted and thanked
the Hungarian officials for Hungary's understanding that freedom is also on
the march in Afghanistan and Iraq and the willingness of Hungary to
participate. They have been participating most recently through the NATO
mission in training in Iraq; they are present in Afghanistan, they are
considering a PRT, heading one of the provincial reconstruction teams in
Afghanistan. And the President expressed appreciation for their support in
freedom's cause more generally.

There was a discussion about the Balkans, the important period of moving
towards the question of final status for Kosovo, the importance that any
final status arrangement provide protections for minorities, and
particularly the Serbian minority in Kosovo, and that also it provide a
prospect for the Serbian people to move towards greater affiliations with
Europe and European institutions, so that it sees that as its vocation and
ultimate destination, in terms of close association with the institutions
of Europe.

There was a lot of discussion about energy, about the need for
diversification of sources of energy, about the need to invest in
alternative technologies, the kinds of things we've been talking about in
the past -- clean coal technology, ethanol, hydrogen propulsion for cars
and the like. A lot of interest in the Hungarian government and cooperation
on those items.

There was some discussion about Russia. President Putin had recently come
to Hungary, made some helpful comments about the history of this period,
and particularly the history in 1956, and a discussion about how we could
reassure Russia that promoting democracy and freedom not only within
Russia, but among Russia's neighbors is not some kind of effort to encircle
Russia, but is, in fact, a good thing for Russia, because democratic states
make good and peaceful neighbors.

I think that's the gist of the conversations, really, with both the
President and the Prime Minister. There was also some discussion about
Iran, the desire that we all have to find a resolution of the nuclear issue
through negotiation and diplomacy, the need for solidarity, and the
remarkable degree of solidarity there is between the United States, Europe,
Russia in these conversations, and of course, the next step there is for
the Iranian government to respond to the proposal that they received here
around the first of the month.

And, Tony, I think that's really what transpired by way of substance over
the course of the day.

Q Former Defense Secretary William Perry just called on President Bush to
launch a preemptive strike against the ballistic missiles that North Korea
is said to be about to test. What does the United States think about that
idea?

MR. HADLEY: Well, we've been pretty clear what we think about that idea,
namely about the test.

Q No, I mean --

MR. HADLEY: I'll get to that. I get it. I'm not being cute. Look, we've
been concerned for a long time about North Korea's development of ballistic
missiles and their willingness to sell them. There is, of course, a missile
technology control regime that is out that we are supportive of, as is most
of the international community, that is trying to stop the trade in
longer-range ballistic missiles. So we've been concerned about the North
Korean program for some time. We've expressed those concerns to the North
Koreans.

As you know, they adopted voluntarily a moratorium in 1999, and reaffirmed
it several years later. And our position is that the North Koreans, as
we've all said several times, should not test -- should not test; they
should respect their own moratorium. That is the message we sent. That is
the message the Chinese, Japanese, South Koreans and everybody else has
sent to the North Koreans -- that we are trying to deal with a broader set
of issues with North Korea through the six-party talks and a test would
obviously be disruptive of those talks.

And the solution is for North Korea to decide to respect its own
moratorium, not to test this missile, come back to the six-party talks, and
let's talk about how to implement the agreement for the denuclearization of
the Korean Peninsula that was reached last September. We think diplomacy is
the right answer, and that is what we are pursuing.

Q Yesterday you said that the -- it was waiting too long for August 22nd,
for Iran to submit their response to the offer. What day would you like for
them to respond? Is it by the time of the G8 foreign ministers' meeting
next week, or when?

MR. HADLEY: We saw that report about the 22nd of August. We've also heard
other things from various Iranian sources. So it's not quite clear what is
the message that we're being sent. So what we have said, at the time that
this proposal was made, I think around the -- on or about the 1st of June,
that a response ought to come in weeks, not months, and it ought to come
through the same channel through which the offer was made, that was, to
Solana to Larijani, so that we know that it is an authoritative response,
so that we know what is the position of the Iranian regime. That's what we
would like to see. Obviously, we think it is a good proposal. It has a lot
in it for the Iranian people, in terms of economic assistance and things
that will open up the Iranian people to the world. We don't see why it
takes a long time to respond to what is a very constructive proposal.

So, obviously, we think weeks, not months. We're into weeks. We ought to
get a response soon. And there are a number of meetings that are coming up
where first foreign ministers, and then heads of state and government of
the states involved will be getting together. And, obviously, it would be
helpful to have a response before that set of meetings associated with the
G8 come forward. But what we've said is, weeks, not months, and we're into
weeks. And we think it's a good proposal and the Iranians ought to come
back and provide some indication of acceptance, so we can start working
through the details.

Q When you say you're hearing things from other various Iranian sources,
what are you talking about, the various news accounts of different people
speaking, or what?

MR. HADLEY: We're hearing various people speaking, some of which is
reported in the press, some of which we're hearing outside the press. And
what we need is an authoritative response.

Q Steve, could I just clarify that? You said, hopefully before the foreign
ministers' G8 meeting.

MR. HADLEY: I said that there are a number of meetings, and it would --
obviously, coming up. In association with the G8 there's foreign ministers,
the actual heads of state and government. It would be helpful and useful if
we could get a response and know where the Iranians are before those
meetings, it would advance the negotiating process.

Q So is it fair to say that you're hoping a response before June 29th -- is
that fair, one of the seven meetings?

MR. HADLEY: I don't have anything to say more than what I really said --
weeks, not months. We're into weeks: sooner would be better. We don't see
why it should take a lot of time. And, obviously, if it can come before
this sequence of meetings or during this sequence of meetings, that would
be helpful. That's really all I've got.

Q Is this being communicated to the Iranians through an official channel,
or is this being communicated through your words today and the President's
words yesterday?

MR. HADLEY: There have been communications of a more official nature to the
Iranian tongs.

Q You're saying it would be helpful.

MR. HADLEY: Right.

Q You're not willing to set any sort of deadline, it would just be helpful
if it came before this date.

MR. HADLEY: It would be helpful.

Q And is there any outside date? When do we start saying it's months,
instead of weeks? Two months from the 1st of June?

MR. HADLEY: We're going to have to see. It's going to depend largely on
what the Iranians do. If they give us a response in the next couple days,
this is going to be a moot point. If it isn't, we'll have to see where we
are.

Q But no deadline?

MR. HADLEY: We're not trying to do this through an arbitrary set of
deadlines. We're trying to do this in a way that is respectful of the
Iranian people and respectful of the regime, and is most calculated to get
a positive response. That's how we're trying to manage this.

Q I had a question on the trade discussions yesterday at the summit. The
Europeans have said that both sides have agreed to put forward new
agriculture offers in the Doha Round talks. Is that a correct
characterization of what occurred in the summit meetings yesterday?

MR. HADLEY: What we have said, and what the President reaffirmed, is that
we made a very forthcoming proposal with respect to tariffs, and
particularly tariffs in the agricultural area and trade-distorting
agricultural subsidies. It was a very ambitious proposal. The President did
it in order to try and get the negotiations going. But when he made that
proposal, he made it very clear that our kind of boldness needs to be
matched by boldness on the part of the other sides -- that is to say from
Europe and from the G20 on agriculture, but also we need a little bit of
boldness and courage in the areas of services and non-agricultural
products. And our take is we have seen some proposals, but not of the kind
of commensurate scale as the one that we made, and that's what we need to
see. We need to see it from the G20 and from Europe with respect to
agriculture; we need to see it from a variety of countries on services and
non-agricultural products.

So we know that we're in the zone of where we can get what we ought to
have, which is an ambitious Doha Round that gets tariffs down. Because,
remember, the principal beneficiaries of this Doha Round are going to be
developing countries. That's why it's called the Development Round for
Doha. And in order for us to do that and to achieve that kind of result,
and make the most of this opportunity, people have to be ambitious. And the
President has been ambitious, has made a bold opening move, and we need
other parties to make comparable moves of similar boldness, so that we know
that we're really going to try and do this and achieve what is possible
here. Then we can get into the details of negotiation. That's what we need
to see next.

Q So the U.S. has not agreed to put forward another agriculture offer,
then, because that's what the Europeans have said occurred yesterday at the
summit meeting, that Borroso and Bush agreed that both sides would do
offers?

MR. HADLEY: Look, there's going to be a negotiating process, obviously, to
get this done. But where we are now is what the President has made is a
bold proposal and what we're looking for is a bold proposal back.

Q The Italian Foreign Minister D'Alema that you saw last week in
Washington, met yesterday with the Iranian Minister Mottaki -- at the end
of the meetings, D'Alema said there is no reason to have an atomic weapon
in Iran in a close time, and he also said that the risk to repeat in Iran
the mistake was done in Iraq. Do you agree with him?

MR. HADLEY: I don't know what he said. I mean, I know what you said he
said. Look, Iran has said it wants a peaceful nuclear program. That's what
its government has said. What we and other countries have said is we have
no problem with a peaceful nuclear program. Indeed, our President has been
out talking about nuclear power as an important aspect of energy security
and diversification. So we have said the issue is not whether Iran can have
a peaceful nuclear power program.

The problem is that the history of the program that they have been
conducting -- which, over a period of 18 years, large portions of which
were not disclosed to the IAEA, as the Iranian regime was required to do --
raised questions about Iran's intentions, and therefore, Iran needs to
reassure the international community that it is only interested in a
peaceful civil nuclear program.

And that's what the EU3 -- sorry -- the UK, France, and Germany -- were
negotiating with Iran, a series of assurances that would reassure the
international community that Iran is only pursuing a peaceful program,
rather than what we have reason to believe is a peaceful program as a cover
for a nuclear weapons program. That's what is so troubling. And that is
what we need to do, and that's why we think it starts with a suspension of
the enrichment program, which is the way you get the fissile material that
would allow you to make a nuclear weapon.

A suspension of the enrichment activity, and then a return to negotiations
so we can come up with an arrangement that will ensure the Iranian people
that they will have access to civil nuclear power and ensure the
international community that it will only be a peaceful civil nuclear
program, not a route to nuclear weapons. That's what we need to do.

Sir.

Q Mr. Hadley, although it's of course been 50 years, the U.S. inaction in
what happened here in Hungary is very much a part of the story and the
history. Will the President acknowledge that publicly in any way, number
one? Number two, could you foresee this administration doing what the
Eisenhower administration did in any similar set of circumstances today?

MR. HADLEY: The President will have an opportunity to address the broader
question in his speech this afternoon. I think one of the things that, as I
mentioned, came out of the discussions he had today is that as he and the
Prime Minister and the President said, those of us who enjoy freedom have
an obligation to support those who are seeking freedom. And that's an
obligation I think, drawing from the lessons of history, we all need to
take seriously.

Sir.

Q Sir, I had two questions, if I may. The first is, the Iranians seem to be
sending mixed signals through mixed channels. Would a way of responding to
that be to say, definitively, that if they wait until August to respond
they risk, by August, facing U.N. Security Council action already?

MR. HADLEY: We think we've been pretty clear about what needs to happen
next and when, in some sense, the timing when it needs to happen. And I
think our best judgment is that that's the best way to get -- to encourage
a positive response from the Iranians, and that's what -- from the Iranian
government, and that's what we're trying to do.

Sir.

Q It's been reported in the last week or so that three years ago, right
after the fall of Baghdad, the Iranians made an unsolicited offer to us to
engage in negotiations, and they had held out the possibility of working to
reduce terrorism in Palestine and also trying to resolve the nuclear
concerns. Can you tell us why the United States did not take that
initiative at that time, and why things have now changed that you would be
willing to entertain that, at least, if they're willing to meet your
conditions?

MR. HADLEY: I really don't know what that article was based on, I must say.
And I just -- I don't know what was talked about. What we've said and where
we are is that we have -- our addressing with the EU3, which we've
identified before -- Russia and China -- we're addressing the issue of
Iran's nuclear program. We have made an offer. We've indicated that if they
will suspend their enrichment program, we will join the negotiations and
try to resolve the nuclear issue.

We think that is the place to start. We have, as the President has
indicated, a long set of concerns with Iran: what they are doing in Iraq,
their support for terror, their treatment of their own people in terms of
denial of freedom, and the like. But in terms of negotiations, we think a
good starting point for addressing those issues is an Iranian-government
response to the proposal that was made and a resumption of the negotiations
on the terms that we described.

Those other issues, obviously we would like to see progress on those
issues. And one of the things we've said publicly is if Iran is interested,
for example, in making progress on their activities in Iraq, one of the
things they can do is stop the flow of weaponry and other materials across
the border from Iran into Iraq that are being used to kill innocent Iraqis
and, in some cases, our coalition.

So you don't have to have a negotiation for the Iranian government to
decide that it's in their interest to work constructively with this new
Iraqi government and be a force for stability rather than, of course, for
disruption, and to try to save lives rather than doing things that are
actually putting lives at risk. You don't need a negotiation for that.
That's something that the Iranians can do. And if we can get into a
negotiation framework on the nuclear issues, and can make progress on those
issues, that would be a good start towards addressing a broader set of
issues.

Yes, ma'am.

Q There has been some suggestion, as mentioned before, that the U.S. should
shoot down a test missile should North Korea launch it. Systems are in
place in the United States. Would the U.S. launch a preemptive missile? Or
is there any other way of defusing this diplomatically? The line has been
only that Pyongyang should come back to the table. It's obviously not going
to do that at this moment.

MR. HADLEY: Well, we hope it would come back to the table, and we would
hope that it would be a little sobered by the unanimous message that the
international community has sent, which is that a North Korean missile test
right now would be, again, breach of North Korea's unilateral undertakings,
and our view is in breach of the commitment in the September agreement
under the six-party talks to try and promote stability in the Korean
Peninsula. So it would be a violation of those understandings and would be
disruptive of resolving the broader set of issues with Korea. So I hope
they will get the message. They certainly are being sent it by all the
principal players through every available channel. And we would hope they
would reconsider.

MR. SNOW: We've got about five more minutes, so if you want to continue
pursuing the foreign policy questions, we'll do that, if you want to
entertain other questions, we'll do those, as well. But I know a lot of you
are going to have to preset for the final event on this trip. So I'm just
stepping in and giving you a little time code.

Mike.

Q May I just follow-up on that question, and ask you more generally, the
philosophy of what the missile defense system is, when it might be used --
there was a Washington Times report that it had been alerted, or somehow
the readiness of it was raised. Could you just talk to us a little bit
about what about that you can describe or what we can know about it?

MR. HADLEY: Yes, can I consult briefly with my colleague here for a minute?

MR. SNOW: We're ready now. (Laughter.)

MR. HADLEY: We're ready, but I'm not quite sure what we should say.

Q Tell us everything. (Laughter.)

MR. HADLEY: Where should I begin? No. Look, I've tried in a number of
different ways to make the point that the way out of this is for the North
Koreans to decide not to test this missile. And that is the way out of it.
And, obviously -- and I really need to just stop it right there. I really
need to stop it right there. I'm sorry about it, but that's really what I
need to do.

Q Also on the missile. The South Korean defense minister said that they
don't think the launch is imminent. What's our reading of where they are?

MR. HADLEY: There's sort of two pieces -- one, there's an issue of
intentions, what the North Koreans are intending to do, and that's sort of
-- you have to kind of read people's minds. The other issues are what are
they prepared to do, or what are they -- do they have the capability to do.
And I think what we've said publicly is we're watching it very carefully.
And preparations are very far along, so you could, from a capability
standpoint, have a launch.

Now, what they intend to do, which is what a lot of people are trying to
read, of course, we don't know. What we hope they will do is give it up and
not launch.

Q Back to Iran and this question about weeks, not months. I'm a little
unclear, because it seems Iran is saying, we are talking about weeks --
eight weeks. And I'm wondering, A, do you think they're doing this in some
way to irritate, and B, what can be done, aside from talk? At some point
you pull the incentive package off the table?

MR. HADLEY: Well, I think what we've done is sort of laid it out pretty
well. I mean, if it's from June 1st -- June, July, August -- that's three;
that begins to sound like months, doesn't it? Now, it's true, months are
made of weeks, so arguably, everything is in weeks. (Laughter.) But come
on. What we've said is, weeks, not months. And what we've also said is that
if Iran does not suspend and does not return to the talks, we have
agreement from our key allies to go forward in New York. And at some point,
at some point, if we do not get the kind of response we seek in weeks, not
months, we have the option of going back to New York and pursuing a U.N.
Security Council resolution.

Now, you could dig all you want; that's all there is, because we are trying
to work this through diplomatic channels in a way I described to maximize
the chance that the Iranians will see it is in their interest to accept
this proposal. That's really all I've got for you.

Q From your talk yesterday, if you had any with Javier Solana, who is fresh
from a visit to Tehran, about the kind of amendments you want to see in
these incentives and what are exactly the issues you have with the
incentives presented to them?

MR. HADLEY: The issue really is we need a response, timely, in weeks, not
months, and there needs to begin with a suspension of enrichment. That's
what we need to see. That, then, opens the door for negotiation. And we can
deal with the issues of the offer that was made.

Q Did he bring any particular demands from Tehran? Did he mention anything?

MR. HADLEY: What we've really been focusing on is getting a response out of
the Iranian government. That's really what we need -- we need to see to
unlock this.

Q Can I just follow up on North Korea again and just make one more try at
this? I know you don't want to say, go beyond anywhere, but you're talking
about a missile defense system, so one would assume if this missile were in
any way threatening us, that you would want to at least attempt to shoot it
down, as a missile defense. Can you go that far and say whether that would
happen? At least reassure people?

MR. HADLEY: Reassure people that --

Q That if they were to launch, that there would be --

MR. HADLEY: Let me try this. We have a missile defense system, which you
know, that is being what we call a long-range missile defense system that
is basically a research, development, training, test kind of system. It
does, of course, as you know from the press, have some limited operational
capability. And the purpose, of course, of a missile defense system is to
defend -- of that missile defense system is to defend the territory of the
United States from attack.

Anything else? Steve.

Q This document that was unclassified yesterday, Republican lawmakers
released it pointing toward 500 weapons dumps or munitions found in Iraq
since 2003, of some chemical weapons. Do you consider this as a smoking gun
of some sort, proving the WMD charge, or is this old material that is
pre-Gulf War? What do you make of it?

MR. HADLEY: I think really it is what it is. There's a declassified, I
think one-pager, that the intelligence community has cleared. I don't know
whether that's been released to the press.

Q It has, yes, it has.

MR. HADLEY: That's really the story, I think. And I don't have a whole lot
to add. It sort of, it is what it is. And I think -- I read that statement
quickly last night and it's really all we can say about it. And I think
people are going to have to draw their own conclusions.

But the bottom line is, 500 chemical munitions in Iraq, and obviously we're
concerned about the potential threat they pose to Iraqis and to our forces.

I think I'm done. One more shot?

Q Let me try on North Korea one more time.

MR. HADLEY: You can try.

Q Okay. One question is, you talked a little bit about this before, what
you think the motives are behind North Korea doing what they're doing. And
two is, how confident is the President in the missile defense system as it
is now?

MR. HADLEY: I've described the missile defense system I think accurately.
It is a research development and testing capability that has some limited
operational capability. It's really the best I can do.

In terms of North Korean intentions, you know, this is a very opaque
society and very hard to read. And you know it's very hard -- I can
speculate on intentions. I don't think it would be useful. What we need to
do is look at their capabilities, and that's what we're trying to do.

Okay, thanks very much.

END 2:50 P.M. (Local)
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