Text 3742, 1036 rader
Skriven 2006-12-04 23:30:56 av Whitehouse Press (1:3634/12.0)
Ärende: Press Release (0612046) for Mon, 2006 Dec 4
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Press Briefing by Tony Snow
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For Immediate Release
Office of the Press Secretary
December 4, 2006

Press Briefing by Tony Snow
White House Conference Center Briefing Room

Press Briefing view


1:06 P.M. EST

MR. SNOW: Questions.

Q So how is the President going to sum up his reaction to all these reports
that he's going to get this month? How are we going to find out what he
thinks of the Iraq Study Group, the NSC? How will that evolve and --

MR. SNOW: Well, we'll let you know. I mean, at some point he'll make his
views known. I don't know exactly how, when or where.

Q An address to the nation?

MR. SNOW: I honestly don't know.

Q Tony, do you expect him to decide by the end of the -- I mean, you said
weeks, not months -- is this by the end of the year, you're saying?

MR. SNOW: There are two conditions that have to apply. First, he has to be
able to see all the finished work product, and you have to have time to
study and take a look through it. So, you know, I hate to be vague about
it, but I'm going to be vague about it. As Steve Hadley said, "weeks, not
months." Obviously, the President wants to look through this. He has said
on a number of occasions over the past month, month-and-a-half, things are
not doing well enough, fast enough and we need to find ways of doing a more
effective job of helping the Iraqi government stand up and be able to meet
its basic obligations.

So I can't lay out a communications plan for you, but we will certainly get
to these as quickly and as thoroughly as we can.

Q And on Wednesday, I mean, the administration has been talking to members
of the Baker-Hamilton group -- is there going to be no reaction to any part
of it on Wednesday?

MR. SNOW: We'll have to see. I mean, I'm sure I'll get asked about it,
because I'll be briefing on Wednesday. But we have not seen the full
report. We have seen press reports, we have gotten some sort of notion
about what may be in it. But I think, again, without having seen the full
report it's both -- I think it's unfair to try to do a full
characterization of something people spent months on, to do a snap
reaction.

But, again, we'll get -- we will get reaction quickly, as well -- but,
again, I think it's important to take a good, thorough look at it. And I'm
sure, as I mentioned in the gaggle this morning, that copies are going to
go around and we're going to let different people in the administration
take a good, thorough look at and we're going to task it out so that it
gets the serious reading and reviewing it deserves.

Q But don't you have a pretty good grasp of what it --

MR. SNOW: No, not really. I mean, it's --

Q Not you, but, I mean members of the administration.

MR. SNOW: No, I don't think so. Really, it -- people have notions of what
may be included; nobody knows for sure. We're going to find out Wednesday
morning; members of the commission are going to come in, they're going to
present the report and they're going to brief on it. And at that point, we
then will have a work product we can contend with.

So, no, I don't -- and I talked with Steve Hadley about this, this morning
-- nobody really has a detailed fix on exactly what's going to be in the
report.

David.

Q Just on this -- how we're going to cover things. Will the President have
some message after his meeting today with al Hakim?

MR. SNOW: If nothing else, we'll get a readout. Right now it's a pretty
restricted meeting; there are going to be four a side. But I am going to
get a readout. And either Gordon Johndroe and I will be able to give you --
I don't know if the President will have a statement on it. It's --

Q It's not for camera --

MR. SNOW: He may have a statement on camera at the very end. I'm not sure;
it may just be photos for pool. But one way or another, we will get you a
readout, because that's important.

Q I have a question about the Rumsfeld memo. At the time when he was saying
to the President, in this memo, that things aren't working in Iraq, the
President was saying two things publicly: One, that we're winning in Iraq,
absolutely; and he was also lashing Democrats, saying that criticism was
not a plan for Iraq, and that we -- the administration -- have a plan for
victory in Iraq. So why wasn't the President leveling with the American
people?

MR. SNOW: Actually, at the time that this came --

Q Why wasn't he saying publicly what top members of this administration who
were running the war were saying privately?

MR. SNOW: Well, there are a couple of things. First, at that very time, he
was actually saying, things are not getting well enough fast enough. That
was a formulation he was using at the time. If you take a look at the
Rumsfeld memo that was printed in The New York Times, what you end up
having is what the President I think has made it clear that he wants, which
are people thinking creatively and exhaustively about ways of getting
better results in Iraq.

And this is not -- other than at the very beginning, he says, clearly U.S.
forces -- it's not working well enough or fast enough, what they're doing.
That is a phrase that the President had adopted and had been using. And I
don't know whether it comes from Secretary Rumsfeld or from the President.
And then you have a list of options.

So I don't think you've got a case where the President was saying one thing
and advisors were saying another. What the President was saying is that
you've got a sovereign government with the government of Prime Minister
Maliki that is pursuing what it needs to pursue, but obviously needs to be
doing so more effectively and more rapidly. And that would include
security. It would include reconciliation. It would include economic
measures. It would include things like the hydrocarbon law. So certainly we
weren't trying to wrap it up into a neat little bundle, because it's a very
complex situation.

Q But doesn't it strike you that at the same time that you and others in
this administration were accusing the likes of John Murtha of cutting and
running by suggesting redeployment of forces to the periphery of Iraq or to
nearby Kuwait, that the Secretary of Defense is suggesting similar options?

MR. SNOW: What Mr. Murtha had suggested was -- he was never quite that
specific, and I think I'd let him speak for himself, but I believe when he
came on "Meet the Press," he was talking about redeploying to Okinawa. What
you have in here is a description of possibly having forces --

Q But that's not the -- he talked about redeploying to Kuwait. You say you
don't want to talk more, but you're not talking accurately.

MR. SNOW: No, here's what he says, is, "You can withdraw forces from
vulnerable positions -- cities, patrolling, et cetera -- and move forces to
a quick reaction force status operating from within Iraq and Kuwait." Now,
it is one of many options that are described here. What it means is the
administration is trying to take a look at every suggestion, as I think
would be incumbent.

Q Wait a second. You're not really answering the question. You're trying to
parse what Murtha's position was.

MR. SNOW: No, I'm not --

Q Wait a second, let me just finish.

MR. SNOW: Okay.

Q Isn't it striking that this administration was accusing the likes of John
Murtha and other Democrats who suggested course correction, including
phased withdrawal, of cutting and running --

MR. SNOW: No, let me --

Q -- at the same time that the Defense Secretary was suggesting just the
same option?

MR. SNOW: No.

Q You don't see hypocrisy there?

MR. SNOW: No, because you're talking about apples and oranges. If you take
a look at --

Q Really?

MR. SNOW: Yes, really -- because there is no suggestion in here that things
be done without regard to developments on the ground. What the President
has already said is, what you try to do is, obviously, we want U.S. forces
to be withdrawing based on what is going on, on the ground in Iraq. And
there is still a significant difference.

Now, I think what's interesting is that we have now gone from an election
season, where there was some criticism of the White House, to one in which
Democrats are going to have responsibility in the House and Senate. And as
they take a serious look at the business of going ahead and building up a
government of Iraq, so that you have a democracy, so that the United States
has the kind of victory that the President has discussed -- which is an
Iraq that can defend, sustain and govern itself, and can be an ally in the
war on terror -- I think you're going to see people working more
constructively. And a lot of the kind of rhetoric that got heated up during
a political campaign, including those who had been saying some pretty tough
stuff about the President. I think that's going to give way to what we hope
will be constructive efforts to get the job done.

Q So this White House is playing it straight with the American people?

MR. SNOW: Yes.

Q Tony, I'd like to follow up on the al Hakim meeting, if I can, for just a
second.

MR. SNOW: Yes, sure.

Q U.S. intelligence and military sources have him intimately connected to
death squads, he is closely tied to Iran --

MR. SNOW: "Intimately connected" with death squads? In what sense?

Q Well, that he was responsible for the --

MR. SNOW: That he was giving orders?

Q Yes, it could be giving of -- when death squads began to emerge, there
are intelligence sources that say he was if not running the show, very
closely connected with the policy of implementing it. So that's number one.
Number two, he's closely tied to Iran. So what's a guy like this doing in
the Oval Office?

MR. SNOW: Well, there are a couple of things -- and we addressed the Iran
question in the gaggle this morning. This is a man who spent 20 years in
Iran when Saddam Hussein was in power, but he's also made it clear that he
sees himself as an Iraqi leader, not somebody who is beholden to Iran.

As regards the issue of militias, certainly they're going to be discussed
in the meeting with the President. What Mr. al Hakim has also done is he
has talked about the importance of reconciliation within Iraq. He leads a
parliamentary bloc that includes 128 members of the Iraqi parliament. And
what the President is going to talk about -- I believe the meeting ought to
be starting any moment now, and that's why we'll give you a readout on it
-- is the importance of reconciliation, of finding people who will be
moderates -- Sunni, Shia, and otherwise -- who are going to be able to work
constructively toward a government that's going to be operating in
conditions of peace.

What you have is a man who has had a number of discussions with this
government and continues to, and the President has had conversations with
him, and has met with him once before, who represents the largest single --
I believe it's the largest single Shia bloc within the Iraqi parliament. He
is a significant force in Iraqi politics, and he's somebody who can play a
very constructive role, and we hope he will.

Q Is the idea to perhaps build a relationship with someone who can be prime
minister if Maliki fails?

MR. SNOW: No. No, it's to develop a relationship with somebody who is a
significant player. We support the Prime Minister. And this is not an
attempt to hedge bets or to play one person off another. Just as the
President will be meeting with the Sunni Vice President of Iraq in the near
future, that is also not an attempt to hedge bets. It is, in fact, a way to
have as many discussions with people who are in significant roles within
Iraq as possible so we can figure out how we can best help.

Q But you're comfortable with the guy you're having a discussion with today
not being another militia leader? You're not talking to him because he's a
rival of Sadr? And you're comfortable that he is not involved with the
death squads in --

MR. SNOW: I'm not going to get up here and characterize intelligence. I'm
going to tell you that militias continue to be a concern, and we share
Prime Minister Maliki's view that there should not be armed organizations
outside the government itself. That would include militias. We don't think
militias are proper.

Q Tony, give me a sense of what reports the President is expecting over
what period of time on Iraq, and the relative import he attaches to them.
Because lately we've been hearing suggestions that the Iraq Study Group
report is not what many people have come to think of it as -- some sort of
--

MR. SNOW: Well, it's interesting, Wendell, because there are a lot of
people -- there are a lot of expectations. I think it's unfair to heap too
many expectations or too few on the Iraq Study Group. These are serious
people who've spent a lot of time studying it. I'm not going to try to
assign either timetables or weights because you do have to take a look at
the work product.

But you know that there is an ongoing review by Pete Pace, the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs. There's an ongoing review at the State Department.
There's an ongoing review being coordinated by Steve Hadley. And there is
the Baker-Hamilton report. The President also has been in consultation with
Prime Minister Maliki. He talks with a number of people, and there have
been outside experts in on a regular basis. So having said that, I know
that each of these is going to be taken seriously. But, I mean, in terms of
trying to come up with some fanciful way of weighting things we haven't
seen, I think that would probably be improper.

Let me put it this way: The President will take all seriously, because as
Commander-in-Chief it's his obligation to do his very best to get the job
done properly, as well and as quickly as possible. And, therefore, he is
going to look seriously at all the contributions and thank those who've
contributed.

Q All come to fruition this month?

MR. SNOW: Don't know. Don't know. Again, I don't know what the deadlines
are. If there are, the President wants them quickly. But we don't have -- I
don't have a date of delivery for you on these.

Q So it's possible the Joint Chiefs' report might not come until next year?

MR. SNOW: Well, again, I will simply repeat what Steve Hadley said, "weeks,
not months." And I cannot give you an absolute date. But as soon as those
become available, we'll be happy to pass them on. We really don't.

Q Ten Americans were killed Sunday in Iraq, or on the weekend. Is there any
impact on the President? Does it affect him at all that there's a growing
consensus in Iraq and America to get out now?

MR. SNOW: Well, it's interesting -- I don't know if there's a growing --
what we hear from the Iraqis is, we want to have the capability so that the
Iraqi security forces can assume the lead. And it is also the case that
they say that they need more. And we are working with them --

Q You're hearing that from people who want to stay in power, believe me --

MR. SNOW: No, wait, look --

Q -- not the people.

MR. SNOW: I don't know, Helen. It's very difficult.

Q The --

MR. SNOW: Okay, well, let me back up. The President is somebody, as I've
said many times, and you've seen it, who grieves the loss of anybody over
there, and this is not something where, as Commander-in-Chief, he wants
anything other than success and to bring everybody home safely.

On the other hand, this is a mission where we will and we must succeed. And
the President understands the difficulties of war, and he also understands
the toll it takes on a public. But as you've heard him say many times, if
you look at this -- what's going on in Iraq, and if the United States
leaves, it creates an even greater opportunity for terrorists to kill
Americans, to kill people around the globe, and to spread oppression, then
we not only will have created -- we not only will have left things in a
position where we're going to have to go back, we also will simply have
stepped away when we knew we had an opportunity to stop terror before the
terror network was able to get access --

Q They're not operating in Iraq. It's, really, the people are against our
presence.

MR. SNOW: People don't want -- let me put it this way: The Iraqi government
has said many times that they want to be able to assume responsibility as
soon as possible, and we want them to do it, too. We want American forces
back as soon as possible, under the proper conditions, and I think Iraqis
agree. What we hear a lot from Iraqis is, we do want you to go, but don't
go until the conditions are right. And we agree.

Q A lot of the Democrats are saying they hope you will nominate someone for
the U.N. who can gain bipartisan support. Is that what your plans are?

MR. SNOW: We think John Bolton -- John Bolton had more -- look, there were
more Democrats who were going to vote for John Bolton than Republicans who
were going to vote against -- there were 58 announced votes in his favor.
That's bipartisan. And John Bolton was a successful U.N. Ambassador, and we
grieve the fact that he was not rewarded for his success and honored for
it.

And we hope that -- we think that this represents, in some ways -- rather
than getting into that, let me just put it this way: If bipartisanship is
to succeed, perhaps we ought to make sure that people who serve their
country ably and well are sent the signal that your services will be
treasured, because when a John Bolton, after the kind of success he's had
as a U.N. Ambassador, cannot get out of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, that sends a discouraging note to anybody who wants to serve
their country.

So the President will continue to look for people of quality, but I'll tell
you what, John had an extraordinarily successful tenure, and this will
disrupt our diplomacy at the United Nations to a certain extent, until we
find somebody in his stead. And we hope the Democrats and Republicans will
join together in allowing the President to put forward somebody who will
represent American interests as ably as John did.

Q How quickly will he move to --

MR. SNOW: Don't know. I mean, that's the President's call, not mine.

Q Tony, can I get back to the Rumsfeld memo?

MR. SNOW: Yes.

Q Rumsfeld says in the memo, advising the President, "announce that
whatever new approach the U.S. decides on, the U.S. is doing so on a trial
basis."

MR. SNOW: That's one of the options.

Q Right, this will give the U.S. the "ability to readjust and move to
another force, if necessary, and therefore, not to lose."

MR. SNOW: Right.

Q Does the President typically get this kind of advice from Rumsfeld, to do
one thing, but tell the American people he's doing something else?

MR. SNOW: No. Again, if you take a look at this, this is illustrative
options and this covers a whole lot of ground. And the President can sort
through it. I think Secretary Rumsfeld was musing, but you'll have to ask
Secretary Rumsfeld what he had in mind.

Q You don't see this as duplicitous in any way?

MR. SNOW: You know, I'll let you characterize it. What he was doing was
laying out options.

Q Well, how does the White House characterize it? To say to tell the
American people one thing and to do another --

MR. SNOW: Well, the White House characterizes it --

Q -- how is that not duplicitous?

MR. SNOW: Again, if you take a look -- Suzanne, you read through every one
of these, correct?

Q Right.

MR. SNOW: And you understand that there are a whole series of options, some
of which probably reflect the thinking of Secretary Rumsfeld and probably
some of which don't; correct? And you understand that these are options
that may represent the views, including of people on Capitol Hill,
Democrats with whom he may disagree. These are not recommendations. These
are options. These are illustrative options. These are ways of looking at
things. And I will leave it at that. You will note that these are not
recommendations by the Secretary of Defense. You're treating it as a
recommendation.

Q But the option -- just listen to the language of the option -- "announce
that whatever new approach the U.S. decides on, the U.S. is doing so on a
trial basis." Is he suggesting that whatever the approach is, we're going
to call it one thing, but it's another? Is that --

MR. SNOW: No -- I will let the words speak for themselves, because,
honestly, I have not spoken with the Defense Secretary about what he meant
by specific bullet points on this and, therefore, I'm going to have to
leave it to him.

Q Can we come back to the reviews that are being done? You've spoken of the
Pentagon, Pace's review, State, Steve Hadley's review. He's met with
Maliki. Those are -- the others are under the President's control. He could
set a deadline. Is there some reason that he hasn't?

MR. SNOW: Well, he's asked them to get it done quickly. If you're worried
about whether there's foot-dragging, no, there's none. But, also, it does
take time to get things done, and quite often people say, we need a little
bit of time to finish up this piece of business, or that. You want to make
sure that you've got the best work product you can. It does not mean that
this thing is going to be delayed forever and ever, but --

Q The signals that you're sending is, you know, wait, there's no urgency
here, we can take --

MR. SNOW: No, no, no, no. I don't think we have ever said there's not
urgency. There's not a panic, but there is certainly a sense of urgency.
And I think the President has been pretty forward-leaning on that for some
time, and clearly, so has the Defense Secretary. So, no, there's absolute
urgency here -- but, again, let me say there's a difference between urgency
and panic. You want to make sure that you are making the right moves for
the right reasons. This does not mean that people can go and take a long
break and get back to us later.

Q Tony, has the President ruled out the idea of meeting with al Sadr?

MR. SNOW: I don't know.

Q And can you answer sort of head on the question of, is this meeting with
--

MR. SNOW: By the way, I'm not -- it's the first I've heard that that has
even been suggested.

Q Well, I guess maybe I should have asked it another way. Would the
President entertain a meeting with al Sadr? Is that something he has any
interest in doing?

MR. SNOW: Well, again, at this point, I don't know. I don't know.

Q And can you answer head on the question --

MR. SNOW: By the way, I don't know if al Sadr would also be willing to
entertain the option. It's a very interesting question; we'll go back and
muse on it in a few minutes.

Q Is this meeting with al Hakim intended to reduce al Sadr's influence
within the government by persuading Hakim to throw his support behind Mr.
Maliki?

MR. SNOW: No, I think what it's designed to do -- look, Moqtada al Sadr
belongs to a party that has 30 seats in the parliament and has some
ministers. It, too, ought to have a vested interest, and we will assume it
does, of the success of the Maliki government. What the President is trying
to do is to talk to significant leaders and make the case that it's
important for people to build together across sectarian lines, to take the
measures necessary for national reconciliation, for economic development --
we talked a lot, for instance, about the importance of the hydrocarbon law
-- and to take the other steps that are going to be necessary to give
Iraqis a shared interest, and an urgent shared interest, in the success of
this government.

Now, you asked this morning about the genesis. This actually originally
came up shortly after the Samara mosque bombings, when the President had a
conversation -- this obviously predates my coming to the White House, but,
apparently, the President made the offer back then that when Mr. Hakim came
to Washington he would like to see him. And so this is the fruition of that
and subsequent conversations.

Q Can I ask you one follow-up? On the memo -- or the reports, all these
various reports, wouldn't you agree that by having so many different
reports available to him, the President, in essence, has given himself
cover to do pretty much whatever he chooses, by saying --

MR. SNOW: Are you saying by doing a thorough job, that's giving cover?

Q I'm saying that he can, at the end, when he has all these reports on his
desk, he can say, well, I'm choosing this one, and --

MR. SNOW: No, the President --

Q -- that the net effect of these reports gives him flexibility to act?

MR. SNOW: You don't understand the President. The President doesn't look
for cover. What he looks for is information to help formulate the best
judgments about how to move forward.

At this particular time, it's a matter of great national interest to try to
make sure that the next steps are the right ones, done in the right way.
And, therefore, he is soliciting as much information and as many views as
he can to try to come up with the best judgments about the ways to make
sure that we address the changing nature of the situation in Iraq, and do
it in such a way that you're going to have better battlefield capability,
that you're going to have the Iraqis more capable of assuming greater
security responsibilities, that you're going to have the economic growth,
that you're going to be able to put together the pieces that in the long
run are going to lay the foundation for real success in Iraq.

That is a complex business, and it is not something that you ought to try
to get from a single source. And as you've seen from things that have
appeared in the paper, the President is inviting people -- as Steve Hadley
said, "open the aperture," try to come up with as many different views on
this as possible, be creative, be venturesome, look at the problem from
different angles, because it is clear that things were not getting well
enough fast enough, and therefore you need people, you need the best
abilities of the folks who are best prepared and have the most knowledge in
the area.

Q Tony, two quick questions.

MR. SNOW: Wait, is this on Iraq, or is this going to take me --

Q No.

MR. SNOW: Let me do the Iraq questions first, and then we'll go --

Q Iraq. With all signs that Bob Gates will be confirmed as Defense
Secretary, will he be able to put his own imprint on the Pentagon's report
on Iraq policy, or is this an ongoing thing that has already been --

MR. SNOW: Well, Pete Pace is -- I don't know about that, but Pete Pace is
the one who has been tasked to do it. That's a good question, but I don't
have an answer for you because, frankly, again, you get back to the
question of deadlines.

We are assuming that the Senate -- we are hoping -- I'm not saying "assume"
-- we are hoping that the Senate will be able to wrap up deliberations and
confirm Bob by the end of the week. But I honestly don't know what the pace
of General Pace's work is, so I don't know if there's even going to be a
position to weigh in at some point.

Clearly, Bob is going to have a say about what goes on. And I'm sure some
of those questions are going to arise in the course of both the public and
the classified testimony this week.

Q What does the President see as his first order of business once he is
confirmed?

MR. SNOW: Bob Gates? I think the first order of business is to continue
working on building up our defense capability, not only in terms of dealing
with the ongoing situations in Iraq and Afghanistan, but continuing the
business of transformation into a world that is much different, and the
challenges are much different than they were even five years ago.

Q Iraq. You said earlier, referring to Democrats, that you're going to see
people working more constructively --

MR. SNOW: I said, we hope we are, yes.

Q Okay. And that these are constructive efforts to get the job done. I
guess I'm wondering how is that going to manifest itself? And are you
having conversations now with Democrats about these kinds of issues --

MR. SNOW: Well, there will be conversations with Democratic leaders between
now and the time the new Congress seats itself. And there have been
conversations going on. I will not characterize them, but, of course we're
going to be talking to leaders -- Democratic and Republican -- of the next
Congress.

Q Do you foresee some kind of event coming up where you get together with
them?

MR. SNOW: No, I don't think so. Democrats also have to finish getting
themselves organized and ready. And the reports we've gotten, as you've
gotten, is that the beginning of January they plan to begin business
immediately. So I have a feeling that they'll be in town a lot, and there
will be plenty of opportunities to talk.

Victoria, war?

Q Yes.

MR. SNOW: Yes, okay.

Q One of the things we heard last week was about speeding up the training
of the Iraqis and how that was going to take place. Why wasn't it already
going full-speed ahead, given that they --

MR. SNOW: Well, it was. But we're also trying to build increased capability
in terms of embeds. And also you look at the Rumsfeld memo, there are also
maybe new ideas of figuring out not merely embedding American forces with
Iraqis, but Iraqis with American. I think people are looking for ways to
try to do this. Also, there has been training of the trainers taking place,
and that will continue to go forward.

Q So was that not happening before?

MR. SNOW: It was happening before. And it has been something -- if you go
back and look through transcripts, we've been talking about this for quite
a while. But we do want to try to figure out how to accelerate it, so that
means trying to get more people in a position where they're going --
capably -- not merely to be training Iraqi security forces, but also -- and
this continues to be an area of concern, and it's one where we've gotten
some help from allies -- the police forces. Because the police forces have,
as you know, been a source of concern, will continue to be. So there's
training going on, on both of those fronts.

Q How about one on Bolton?

MR. SNOW: Yes.

Q Isn't this an example of the system working exactly as it should? There
are enough senators who didn't like his performance, who didn't want him in
place. They were able to block him.

MR. SNOW: Well, Ken asked that question this morning. I suppose if you
decided that you wanted to shut down the government because you just didn't
-- regardless of the success or failure of the person, you wanted to make a
point to the other side, that could be seen as "a success of the system."
Procedurally, it's how the system works.

But the American people are going to ask themselves, do we really want a
system where a guy has gone through and he has led successful diplomatic
efforts in dealing with North Korea, in dealing with Iraq, in dealing with
Lebanon, in dealing with Darfur, and has managed -- has been a highly
capable, competent and effective and sometimes very creative diplomat
working with other countries, building large coalitions, as well as
coalitions within the U.N. Security Council, people are going to say, why
didn't that guy -- they didn't like him, why? What was it about his
performance that they didn't like? Here's somebody who said, I care about
the United Nations, and therefore it's important that this institution
reform itself, because it is no secret that here in the United States it is
not held in as high regard as it used to be. And the United States is a key
contributor -- the key contributor to the United Nations.

The American people are going to ask themselves, wow, why didn't they
confirm him? So whether that is a -- whether that is a sign of the system
succeeding or failing, I will leave it to other people to say. We think
that John Bolton richly deserved full confirmation as ambassador, and we're
saddened by the fact that he didn't get it.

Q And why did they not confirm him in your view?

MR. SNOW: I don't want to try to characterize. You may ask them.

Wendell --

Q Where's the success in Darfur, North Korea, Iran?

MR. SNOW: Well, let me put this way, Wendell: Before you did not have -- as
far as the six parties -- the Chinese and the South Koreans taking the
kinds of positions they have had. When it comes to Iran, you did not have
the kinds of coalitions -- including the Russians -- working with us on
Iran. When it came to Darfur, the United Nations itself was not willing to
step up. Now there is United Nations participation.

So I would argue, Wendell, that the United Nations is not necessarily a
place whereby passing a resolution you are going to wipe a problem away;
but what we have done is we have created coalitions where parties that in
the past have not been full shareholders and stakeholders in what was going
on, they now are. And so you have increased and increasingly constructive
participation on the part of our allies on issues of key international
concern.

And if you believe that diplomacy is the proper way to go, you want that.
You want the people who have clout. You want the people who have the
closest relations. You want them to step up and assume some responsibility,
and they've done so.

Q But success means -- Tony --

MR. SNOW: Go ahead, April.

Q But success for Bolton, wouldn't that constitute the fact that there are
solutions to these situations, not just movement on the measuring stick,
but total success in the direction of Darfur?

MR. SNOW: Well, let me put it this way, April: I don't know if anybody
knows the solution to success in anything, whether it be television ratings
or anything else. It's a very complex world out there. So what you end up
doing is you try to put together -- you're not going to have success in the
form of a resolution. What you are going to have is the development of a
kind of diplomacy that draws into the diplomatic process people who in the
past have not been fully engaged -- I know that was kind of artless -- not
been fully engaged. And, therefore, what you've done, I think, is you've
created -- I hate to use the term -- more assertive and coordinated
diplomacy. And that's an important thing. The United Nations is a place
where you do diplomacy.

To get the United Nations to step up and take some -- take a role in
Darfur, that is a step forward. It is not a solution. Ultimately, the
solutions to a lot of these problems lie in the hands of people who are on
the ground in the various places. In Darfur, the jinjaweed have to assume
some responsibility for what goes on in Darfur. It is not simply going to
be done out of writ in New York. But based on what the United Nations does,
John Bolton was highly successful.

Q Has this administration changed the definition of success?

MR. SNOW: No. Have you? What is -- what is your definition of diplomatic
success?

Q I'm listening to what you're saying here and then going back a couple of
weeks ago, when you said, "We're winning but we haven't won." And now
you're saying, what is it, we're more assertive, we've coordinated
diplomacy --

MR. SNOW: I didn't want to use the word "robust" again.

Q Okay.

MR. SNOW: "Doonesbury" is going to beat me up again. (Laughter.)

Q Okay, all right. But the definition, it seems like you're re-crafting how
a win is perceived, how success is --

MR. SNOW: No, we're talking about diplomacy, April. We're talking about
diplomacy. We're talking about the limited horizon within which the United
Nations can operate. And within that horizon, John Bolton was highly
successful. I would argue during his tenure there -- I would guess that if
you asked people going in, especially those who've been skeptical, whether
he had achieved one, let alone all of these things, they probably would
have told you, no.

Q Well, can I ask you about the Supreme Court now?

MR. SNOW: No, wait and I'll get back to it.

Q Iraq? Tony, back on Iraq?

MR. SNOW: Yes, Iraq. Let's finish Iraq, and then we'll get back to others.
Yes.

Q Although we're not talking with the Iranians, the Iraqis are. And there
have been a number of visits. Prime Minister Maliki, President Talabani met
both with Ahmadinejad and with al Khamenei, do we get any feedback on that?
Are they telling us anything about what the Iranians are thinking, since we
don't know ourselves?

MR. SNOW: What do you mean we don't know? We've got a pretty clear idea.
It's not like President Ahmadinejad has been bashful about his views. But
on the other hand, we understood --

Q -- other statements, private conversations with regard to Iraq?

MR. SNOW: I don't know -- if there was a conversation of that sort, it
would have been in the one-on-one session between the Prime Minister and
the President, and I don't know what they said. When it comes to those
kinds of talks, we fully expect Iraq to be holding conversations with its
neighbors. It's incumbent upon it to do so. But I don't know if there is
any readout or assessment.

But, I mean, we made clear our view of what the Iranians should do. Let me
put it this way: The characterization we did get was that the Iranians need
to play a constructive role, not a destructive role, when it comes to
enabling the Maliki government to succeed. And I mean, I can't go much -- I
know that's kind of boilerplate, but that's basically as detailed as
anything I heard. But it doesn't -- I cannot tell you that there weren't
more substantive conversations, but if they were, they were between the two
heads of state.

Q Tony, on Iraq?

MR. SNOW: Iraq.

Q Is the status quo approach on the table, or is that the one approach the
administration has determined is not the way to go?

MR. SNOW: We've never had a status quo approach. This whole stay the
course/status quo idea -- I know that the President had used the "stay the
course" locution, but there's never been a status quo. I believe what we've
said many times, Ken, is that the status quo, in fact, is not acceptable,
and that there do have to be measures where you find ways to make
reconciliation a reality within Iraqi life, that you find ways to tamp down
on sectarian violence, that you find ways to isolate, disable and disarm
militias and violent factions so that you have the basis for a stable
democracy.

That is not a status quo -- the only thing that hasn't changed is our
determination that we help the Iraqis build a government that can defend,
sustain and govern itself. That hasn't changed. That's not status quo; that
is the end state that we pursue. But on the other hand, you are constantly
changing the way you go about it because the situation always changes. The
enemy adjusts; you adjust. And that's the way --

Q Do you believe that all these exercises will lead to, by someone's
measure, a significant change in approach?

MR. SNOW: I don't know. But what I will do is I will let you draw judgments
after the President has made clear what changes he intends to make.

Q I have one on Iraq.

MR. SNOW: Okay, yes.

Q On Tony Blair's visit -- on Iraq -- is he invited at this time because he
contributed to the report? And will he be getting an advanced assessment of
the report?

MR. SNOW: I'm sorry, run that by me again.

Q You announced Tony Blair is visiting on Thursday. Is he going to get an
advanced copy of the report --

MR. SNOW: Well, we're not getting an advanced copy, so I don't suspect he
will.

Q Is his visit at this time -- announced --

MR. SNOW: No. This has been something that they've been wanting to do for
some time. November sort of got knocked off the map because we were on the
campaign trail the first week; we had a week back in town, then we were in
Asia; then we were back in town for four days; then we did Europe and the
Middle East. So that kind of cut down on the available time. Once you get
into next week, once again you have pretty full social schedules and
otherwise for both the President and the Prime Minister. This became the
week that offered the very best opportunity for the two to meet. They've
been trying to get together for some time.

Q Can we assume the future of troop deployment is the major part of the
talks, though?

MR. SNOW: No, you can't. I wouldn't make any assumptions. I'll let the two
heads of state characterize whatever. I mean, I think Iraq is going to be a
big part of it; Afghanistan -- as you know, there was a conversation about
Afghanistan at NATO last week. But the Americans and the Brits have a lot
of other common concerns, including Darfur, a lot of diplomatic efforts,
concerns about Iran.

So all of these things -- and I've been in on a handful of these
discussions; they tend to be pretty freewheeling and pretty honest, and so
it's not -- I don't think that there's an agenda that, this time we're
going to concentrate on X. What they do is they sit around and they talk
very honestly and openly about all of these issues, and I would expect the
same thing to happen this time.

Q Any meals planned? Any lunches, dinners --

MR. SNOW: Well, I'm sure he will be fed. We're hospitable that way. In
fact, we're going to feed you guys before too long. (Laughter.)

Q Any press avail?

MR. SNOW: I suspect so, but I'm not sure. I mean -- and I don't know how
broad or how narrow.

Goyal.

Q Talking about Afghanistan and NATO --

MR. SNOW: Wait a second. Are there other Iraq questions? Okay, go ahead.

Q (Inaudible). My question is, is he going to carry maybe some message from
the top leader from Iran to President Bush?

MR. SNOW: I don't know. Again, our -- I just don't know. We're going to
give you a readout. I will get it from National Security Advisor Hadley,
and you can either contact me or Gordon Johndroe in the next few hours and
we'll try to -- one way or another, we'll get you a readout on the message
-- I mean, on the meeting. I'm not anticipating such a thing, but rather
than trying to rule something out, you never know what's going to happen.

Q Tony, talking about NATO and Afghanistan, if the President has seen
today's Washington Post and The Washington Times, they are saying the same
thing I've been saying for the last three years, since President Karzai
also told President Bush in the White House, especially Mr. Fareed Zakaria,
of Newsweek, he's pointing out that there are problems in Afghanistan
because -- and NATO is also saying -- that terrorism or Talibans are coming
across the border from Pakistan. He's pointing out clearly to General
Musharraf in Pakistan all those problems in Afghanistan, to then comparing
with Iraq and Afghanistan, the future will be very dark as far as
Afghanistan is concerned.

MR. SNOW: Well, look, we continue to take a look at what's going on in
Afghanistan, as well. When President Musharraf and President Karzai were
here, there were considerable conversations about border security. And
they've agreed to work on it, and it is an area of concern, and it does
need to be addressed.

Q Tony --

MR. SNOW: Two questions. (Laughter.)

Q Two questions.

MR. SNOW: First. (Laughter.)

Q The Washington Post published --

MR. SNOW: The Ho Chi Minh pictures --

Q Yes. And I'm just wondering they also had a letter from Anne Jacoby, the
wife of an Army officer who served in Vietnam, saying she was horrified to
see the President smiling as he stood up there, which was disrespectful of
those Americans who served so bravely against hideous atrocities sanctioned
by Ho Chi Minh. And my question, she asked, where were the President's
advisors when he was allowed to be seen in that photo op?

MR. SNOW: Well, let me just -- I don't want to pick a fight with Ms.
Jacoby, so I will not. But the President was meeting with the elected
leaders in Vietnam in their chambers, each of which featured some statuary
that involved Ho Chi Minh.

The other thing I would point to Ms. Jacoby is she would have been moved by
the fact that tens of thousands in Saigon, and maybe hundreds of thousands
in Saigon, and at least tens of thousands in Hanoi lined the streets when
the President came. This is a country that loves Americans, that is eager
for free markets, and for closer contacts with the United States of
America. And that, in fact, what has happened -- I forget who did it, but
somebody wrote an op-ed piece saying, the United States won. And in a
sense, if you take a look at the battle between communism and free markets,
you're going to find that the desire for freedom and entrepreneurship is
very strong in Vietnam. And those of you who were on the trip, saw pretty
good evidence of it.

Q WorldNetDaily quotes two Republicans, Colorado Republican Tom Tancredo as
saying, the President of the United States is an internationalist who
believes that America is an idea, not an actual place defined by borders. I
mean, this is where this guy is going. And another reelected Republican,
Ron Paul, of Texas, denounced plans for the proposed NAFTA super highway.
And my question, what is the President's comment on these two statements by
reelected Republicans?

MR. SNOW: Well, I would be surprised if he knew about either of them,
therefore, I would not -- no, I'm serious, Les. This is not the sort of
thing -- let me see, what has the President been doing? Oh, yes, he's been
spending a lot of time thinking about the war in Iraq. He has completed two
significant foreign trips. I'm not sure he's had time to review the in-box.
And, frankly, I don't know if either forwarded their thoughts to the White
House, but I will assume on the basis of your question, they have been
forwarded herewith.

Q Thank you.

MR. SNOW: Okay, thank you.

Q Wait a minute, hold it, Supreme Court.

MR. SNOW: Supreme Court, go ahead.

Q Thank you, yes. The President has been touting the greatness of Brown
versus the Board of Education results from the Supreme Court, the ruling
from the Supreme Court many years ago. But now he is siding with parents
against race preferences for school placement. And some are saying that
could actually narrow Brown versus Board of Education.

MR. SNOW: That's for the courts to decide. But as you probably know, some
parents have sued because of the way in which students have been
characterized. In the case of Seattle, students are lumped into two groups:
white and nonwhite. And in Louisville, into black and other, which hardly
seems consistent with either the attitude or the direction of Brown versus
the Board of Education.

No Child Left Behind is designed in a color-blind way to say that our
schools ought to be providing first-rate educations to everybody, period.
The President has talked about being far more honest about both the virtues
and shortcomings in schools, and making sure that everybody has access to a
first-rate education.

One of the interesting things is one of the results and one of the fears in
at least one of these cases is that in Seattle, it may be the case that a
black student would be denied permission to transfer from one school to
another, where his or her parents may want to go, because that would
disrupt the racial balance, whereas the white student would have an
opportunity to do so. That also seems to be something that may raise
questions of fairness.

So it's worth taking a look also at the details of the plans involved here,
but the President certainly remains firmly committed to the goals of Brown
versus the Board. And this is one of these issues quite often where the
issues of racial preferences come up that that flies in the face of Brown
versus the Board. And, therefore, I'm not sure it's going to provide the
kind of result you want.

So this is not one of these things where the President is trying to stand
in the way of opportunity. As a matter of fact, the President has argued
repeatedly, April, that people ought to have the opportunity for better
educations. And he sometimes has been resisted by leaders who may, in fact,
be party to part of this debate. I don't know. But the fact is that when
you have a program that denies somebody the right to transfer -- on the
basis of their race, not on the basis of their need or their personal
concerns -- and that is the concern both in Louisville and Seattle, it
seems to me that you do not have a triumph of color-blind equality. But in
fact, you have just the opposite.

Q But, Tony, it's said that this could have far-reaching ramifications, the
fact that it could affect issues of performance matching anything with a
race preference as it relates to --

MR. SNOW: Well, we don't see it that way. But I tell you what, for more
nuanced views, I would refer you to the Office of the Solicitor General,
because they're the ones who make arguments in these cases.

Q Thank you.

END 1:50 P.M. EST
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