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Skriven 2007-01-10 23:30:58 av Whitehouse Press (1:3634/12.0)
Ärende: Press Release (0701101) for Wed, 2007 Jan 10
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Background Briefing by Senior Administration Officials
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For Immediate Release
Office of the Press Secretary
January 10, 2007

Background Briefing by Senior Administration Officials
Room 450
Eisenhower Executive Office Building


˙˙˙˙˙ Highlights of the Iraq Strategy Review (PDF) ˙˙˙˙˙ Fact Sheet: The
New Way Forward in Iraq

12:25 P.M. EST

MR. SNOW: Hello, everybody. The ground rules are this is a background
briefing by a senior administration official. We have promised some
documents to you; those are still in production. We will notify you as soon
as they are ready, but they will be ready for you well in advance of the
President's speech tonight. They'll lay out a lot of the basics of the
policy. Obviously, feel free to contact us with any questions you have
afterward.

But in order to frame it up, I introduce SAO.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm going to try and give you a little feel
for what the President is going to say tonight, but I'm going to try to do
it in a way that walks you through the logic of the strategy review we've
been through, and a little bit, the logic of the President's thinking and
how I think you'll hear it tonight.

He will talk about the hopes we had at the end of 2005 for progress in 2006
on the political side, against the violence, and the prospects even for
beginning to reduce our troops. He will say that that was dashed in 2006.
And really what happened was sectarian violence got out ahead of Iraqi
forces, it got out ahead of American forces, and it overwhelmed the
political progress that we expected.

And he will then conclude that the situation in Iraq is unacceptable. It's
unacceptable to the American people and it's unacceptable to him. He will
make clear that our current strategy in Iraq is not working; that he has
conducted an extensive review to develop a new strategy; that in the course
of that review, two things became clear and really almost reflected a
consensus, whether it was congressional leaders, foreign leaders, or the
Iraq Study Group, and that is two things -- one, there are no silver
bullets here, and secondly, America cannot afford to fail, but we must
succeed.

So the challenge, then, is, what is a strategy for success? And you have to
start that with, what is the diagnosis of the problem? And the problem, at
this point, is the challenge of sectarian violence. It is synonymous with
security in Baghdad since 80 percent of the sectarian violence occurs
within a 30-mile radius of Baghdad. So the challenge is dealing with
sectarian violence and bring security to the people of Baghdad.

He will say very clearly that Americans, the coalition cannot do that; the
challenge of dealing with the sectarian violence is a challenge to the
Iraqis, the Iraqi people, who will have to decide whether they want to live
together in peace, and to the Iraqi government, whom the Iraqi people
expect to bring security to them in Baghdad. And he will make clear that
the Iraq government needs to step up and do that.

The good news is that the Iraqi government has -- they have come forward
with a plan. This was first given to the President when he was in Amman,
Jordan, and met with Prime Minister Maliki. Maliki's security people, the
government security people, and our commanders have been working on that
plan. The good news is that they believe that the plan fixes the problems
that plagued our earlier efforts to bring security to Baghdad and is a plan
that will work. And he'll describe it in some detail. I can do that, but
I'd like to do it at the end, because otherwise, we're just going to go
right down the details, and I want to give you a little bit of the
framework.

The plan fixes a number of -- it is different from what we've done before
in four respects. One, it's a different and better concept of operations,
which I'll go through. Secondly, it will be adequately resourced. We did
have not enough forces before. Front and center, it will be additional
Iraqi forces. Iraq will add three army brigades to Baghdad. They will end
up having nine Iraqi brigades and nine Iraqi national police, as well as
local police.

Second -- first of all, then, it is an Iraqi plan, and it's Iraqi led.
Secondly, it will be adequately resourced first and foremost by the Iraqis.
Third, those forces will operate under rules of engagement. And that's
probably a misnomer. Let me put it this way; prior to now, Iraqi security
forces in Baghdad got a lot of political and, in some sense, sectarian
instruction and interference. And Prime Minister Maliki and the members of
his government have made clear that that will end, and that the Iraqi
commanders, once given this responsibility, will be given the full
authority to carry it out and will be free of political and sectarian
influence. We think that those things taken together give a different
situation and allow for the prospects of success.

And the last thing I would say is that if the prior strategy was to clear,
hold and build, we cleared but did not hold, and the build never arrived.
And so a piece of this plan is to follow on the military operations with
economic assistance and putting people to work.

Our commanders have said that the Iraqis clearly would like to do this
themselves, but their commanders -- their security officials and our
commanders have concluded that their resources are not adequate. And
therefore, the military has recommended that additional U.S. forces go into
Baghdad. The President, in response to that, has committed five additional
U.S. brigades to Baghdad to go into Baghdad. They will move into the
theater over time as they get developed, but they will operate very much in
support of Iraqi forces.

And let me just describe briefly, then, how the Iraqi forces are going to
operate in Baghdad. There will be an overall Iraqi commander. That Iraqi
commander will have two deputies, one for each side of the river. They will
then have authority over the nine districts of the city. In each district
there will be an Iraqi commander. That Iraqi commander will have authority
over all Iraqi army units, Iraqi national police, and local police in that
district. They will operate in a coordinated way.

They will operate out of police stations in the district, and their job
will be to go out in the community, to patrol, to do any necessary
checkpoints, and to go door-to-door, not to kick the door in, but to talk
to the residents and make it clear that they understand that Iraqi forces
are now providing security in the country.

The U.S. role will be to support that effort and help the Iraqis provide
population security in Baghdad. To help that, in each district, there will
be a U.S. army battalion -- that's 400 to 600 folks -- working in and
closely with the Iraqi forces. Those forces, of course -- our forces will
remain under U.S. command, but they will work with and in support of the
Iraqi forces.

They will do it in several ways. One, there will be U.S. forces embedded
with Iraqi units, and one of the things resulting from the strategy review
is an expansion of our embedding. That is a good way to supplement the
training we've been doing, training that gets the force up and into the
field. It is embedding that will help that force, the Iraqi force, be
effective in bringing security, but it's also -- think of it as an
on-the-job training, a way to ensure that the Iraqis are better and more
effective, both in their job and develop more effectiveness over time.

So our forces will do some embedding. They will be there to counsel the
Iraqi forces, and, of course, if the Iraqi forces get into trouble, they
will be there to help them in extremis. But my point overall is this is an
Iraqi plan with an Iraqi lead that we believe will fix the problems that
have plagued earlier efforts, and our forces will be in support.

There are other features of this. One of the things is that the President
will say very clearly that it is time for the Iraqis to step forward; that
there is no indefinite commitment to U.S. presence in Iraq; that our
presence is there to enable the Iraqis, but that works only if the Iraqis
step forward and step up. And he's made it very clear that if the Iraqis do
not do that, they will lose the support of the American people. And the
Iraqi people are making it clear that they will also lose the support of
the Iraqi people, because the Iraqi people have made very clear they're
sick of the violence in Baghdad and they want their government to provide
security.

The purpose of all this is to get the violence in Baghdad down, get control
of the situation and the sectarian violence, because now, without it, the
reconciliation that everybody knows in the long-term is the key to getting
security in the country, the reconciliation will not happen. The Sunnis do
not know whether -- and do not have confidence this government is going to
survive in the long-term, and the Shia are skeptical of the government
because it is not providing them protection. So the President's judgment is
the first step of a successful strategy in Iraq has to be helping the
Iraqis bring security to Baghdad.

As that occurs, we have made very clear that the Iraqi government needs to
meet the benchmarks it has set in order to do the things on which a broader
reconciliation are required. And you all know them. They're the oil law;
they're deBaathification, narrowing the limitations of the deBaathification
law; they're provincial elections to bring the Sunnis back into the
political process at the local level. There is also continuing, and we
would hope even accelerating the transition of security responsibility to
Iraqis elsewhere in the country and in Baghdad, because if this works it
will actually enable Iraqis sooner to provide security in Baghdad. And we
have -- would like, and the Iraqis have made clear that one of their
benchmarks is to take responsibility for security in the whole country by
the end of the year.

So this is a vehicle for bringing security, encouraging and supporting
Iraqis in the broader reconciliation that they need to do. The President
will talk about a number of ways where we can support this broader effort.
He will talk about ways we can support and accelerate the training of
Iraqis through greater embedding, through greater provision of equipment,
through supporting Iraqi plans to expand the size of the Iraqi army -- they
intend to put greater reliance on the Iraqi army for security.

There are also things that we can do to support them economically. They've
announced a $10-billion reconstruction and infrastructure effort. We can
complement that. And finally, the Secretary of State will be talking in her
testimony about the expansion of provincial reconstruction teams, doubling
the number of Americans that will be out in the provinces, basically
helping Iraqis build their government from the bottom up, focusing on local
reconciliation efforts, local economic assistance efforts, and the like.

He will also talk about the broader regional context, the importance that
the effort in Iraq not fail; that the experiment in democracy is a piece of
a broader struggle in the Middle East between the forces of moderation, the
responsible forces committed to democracy, and those extremist forces that
are using terror as an instrument for their own agendas; and the
consequences of failure in Iraq for all our allies and friends and
supporters in the regions that are moderate and are pursuing democracy. He
will talk about some of the things that we are doing to strengthen our
commitment and capability in the region.

He will also talk about things that we need to be doing over the long-term
to strengthen the ability of the United States and its allies to deal with
the war on terror over the long-term. He'll talk about expanding the Army
and the Marine Corps. He'll talk about trying to find a way to get
Americans able to go overseas in post-conflict situations to help
struggling democracies build the infrastructure of democracy -- the police
forces, the court systems, the effective administration -- all the things
these countries need to go from post-conflict situations to successfully
providing services to their people.

Finally, one of the thematics he will talk about is the importance of
trying to -- of improving and strengthening relations with Congress. He
will have some ideas how to do that to institutionalize contacts between
the executive branch and the Congress on dealing with the issue of the long
war, and his desire -- and his -- understand there will be questions that
will be raised about the President's strategy, and he welcomes those, he
welcomes the debate. We hope that people will have time for that debate to
occur before taking preemptive action, if you will, and asking that those
-- he believes that success is essential and he has a plan for success.
He's prepared to defend it, but those who criticize it have, in some sense,
a burden to come forward with an alternative path that they think will
succeed.

I should make one other note, and then I'll stop. He will also talk about
Anbar Province. This is in the west on Iraq. As you know the problem there
is not sectarian violence; it is a struggle against al Qaeda. Anbar is
basically al Qaeda's base of operations in Iraq. There is an opportunity
there because local Sunni tribes have turned against al Qaeda and are going
after al Qaeda there. Our local commander believes that a couple additional
U.S. battalions, basically a plus-up -- net plus-up of about 4,000 would
enhance our ability to help the Iraqi forces there exploit the opportunity,
and he will announce that in his speech, as well.

That's what I've got for you. I'd be glad to take any questions.

Q At the start of the war, some of the generals were saying more troops
were needed, and the President, at that time, did not listen to that
advice. Now the generals are very wary about sending more troops, and, yet,
the President is making a decision to send more troops. Why is it that he
believes this is a wise course of action after the history of how things
have gone in terms of troop levels?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the rationale for it I've really
given you. I think, though, I see the history a little different. One of
the issues is the Iraqis -- every time we get in discussions with Iraqis
about more troops, they generally said, if we need more troops, they need
to be Iraqi troops, so please train more Iraqi troops. This is -- Iraqis
really want to take more responsibility.

They have concluded -- that is to say, the security people advising Prime
Minister Maliki and our commanders have decided that in order to make this
plan work -- and everybody believes it is essential that it work -- they
need more troops. This recommendation and this plan, in terms of the
troops, has the support of General Abizaid, General Casey, General
Petraeus, Admiral Fallon, Pete Pace and the Joint Chiefs. This has been a
lengthy process that has brought forward this strategy going forward, and
it has the support of both the old and the new commanders. So it's just --
it is something that we have all come together on and that has the support,
as I say, of the military.

Q The President long said that he didn't want any timetables, that he would
not abandon the Iraqi people, and you're talking about it not being an
indefinite commitment. So describe for us that change and how he now will
accept benchmarks that have time associated with them.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, he hasn't got time lines, he's got
benchmarks -- benchmarks that the Iraqis have set for themselves. And he's
basically saying, look, it is time for them to perform.

On the one hand, you can say this is a government that has been in power
only nine months, an experiment in democracy in a place that's known
tyranny for 30 years. On the other hand, it is clear that the Iraqi -- that
the patience of the Iraqi people is running out, and, quite frankly, the
patience of the American people is running out. And he's been very clear to
the government leaders he's spoken to -- he spoke to a number of them this
morning -- it is time for this government to perform.

They have concluded that, as well. They have set forward this plan. They
have brought forward these benchmarks. And what the President is saying is,
fine, we will judge you now less on your words and more on your
performance.

Q How do you compel that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think it's -- I think there's two things.
One, I think the Iraqi people are compelling it. This is, after all, a
democracy. There is, as you can tell, unhappiness in Iraq that this
government has not made the decisions it needs to make. And I think they
will hear from the President tonight that the patience of the American
people is not unlimited, and they're not oblivious to what is going on on
Capitol Hill and the kinds of statements that you've been hearing from
Leader Pelosi and others. I think they've got it clear.

Q Underpinning this seems to be a supreme confidence in Prime Minister
Maliki to take the lead, despite problems that you've articulated, despite
a lack of control in that country. What is that confidence based upon, and
isn't it a gamble to put that much faith --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think the premise of your question is
wrong. There's a lot of skepticism in the country about Prime Minister
Maliki. I think, in some sense, a lot of people in the United States share
that skepticism. We've been very clear about it. The point is, this is an
elected government, it is a unity government. They have come forward with
Prime Minister Maliki as the Prime Minister. We will, of course, work with
the elected officials of the Iraqi government, but we will, at the same
time, say it is time for this government to perform.

Why are -- what is the basis for thinking they can do it? One, that the
statements are different. There seems to be an expression of will.
Secondly, there seems to be within the Iraqi political system a recognition
of the imperative to act. Third, they have come forward with plans that are
credible, and they have made commitments to resource those plans. We will
see over the next several months whether they begin to make good on those
commitments. And I think there is obviously skepticism, and the President
has made that very clear to this government: People are skeptical -- your
people are skeptical, our people are skeptical. I will support you, but you
need to perform.

Q So are the troop deployments directly tied to those benchmarks? Has the
President said, or will he say to the Iraqi government, unless X happens,
he won't deploy more troops?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, he won't say that, and part of it is
because when you're trying to empower a government, you don't talk to them
in those terms -- you must do this, or else. This is a government we're
trying to strengthen, and trying -- and basically to make clear that they
are doing this for their own reasons. And that's what Maliki says -- I'm
doing it for my own reasons because it needs to be done for my country.

So we will not be structured in that way. But I think it's very clear that
they have made some commitments. We have said very clearly, this is your
responsibility, you have -- it is your plan, you need to execute that plan.
We can come in behind, but we're not going to come out in front. They're
going to need to step forward. And we are going to have to see that they
are beginning to implement their plan.

David.

Q Well, can I just follow up? On the benchmarks, then, I can't see what's
new with the benchmarks. As you said, we all know what those benchmarks
are. And those were part of the original Baghdad security plan. It was a
plan that said, we want you to do this, that, and the other. And they
didn't do it. The plan was clear, hold and build. It didn't happen. So --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Right, well --

Q -- is this just a more hopeful plan?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, what I described in some detail is how
the Baghdad security plan is different, and why we think this plan has a
better prospect of success. That, of course, requires Iraqis to do some
things. We will have to see whether they do those.

I'm not saying -- I did not claim that everything under the sun here is
new. My premise is, as everyone says, there's no silver bullet, there's no
magic plan out there. We've all known that in order to solve the problem in
Iraq, you've got to do something about security, you've got to do something
about the politics, you've got to do something about economics. Sure,
benchmarks have been around. What I think is different is a new seriousness
by the Iraqis and the United States that they need to be met.

David.

Q Following up on Martha's thought, there seems to be a tension between the
implicit statement the President has that our commitment is not open-ended,
which is to say if they don't perform, at some point in the future American
commitment to this may begin to pull back, and the President's oft-repeated
statement that he can settle for nothing short of victory, which would seem
to suggest we're there until we win. So can you reconcile those two? And
can you tell us whether the President is going to use the phrase "victory"
the way he did in his "victory in Iraq" speeches in the end of 2005, and
whether he defines it the same way that he did then?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, you'll see it in the speech. I think
we're in -- you'll see what he says in the speech tonight. I think you'll
see some words like "success" and "victory," but we're in a very different
context, we have a very different strategy. And I think you'll find that
that will affect how he uses those terms. But I think on that piece, I
think we ought to wait until the speech tonight.

Secondly, there is broad consensus that we cannot fail in Iraq. The
President has gotten the strategy that he believes will succeed and is the
best prospect of success. Now, everybody is going to want to say, well,
what if it doesn't work, what is plan B, and all the rest. And I think, for
obvious reasons, for the President and for senior administration officials,
we're going to focus on what we need to do to make this plan work.

This would be a three-for for The New York Times; let's go to The
Washington Post.

Q Didn't Prime Minister Maliki make a pledge that he would crack down
against Moqtada al Sadr, specifically? Did he pledge that he would move
into Sadr City? And do you envision, under this partnership between U.S.
and Iraqi forces, that U.S. troops might be acting against the Mahdi Army?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Maliki has said publicly that this is about
the rule of law, and that this is about bringing the rule of law to all
groups who act outside the law -- whether Sunni, Shia. And everybody knows,
and he has said explicitly, that the militias have to be dealt with,
because they are operating outside the law. He said very clearly that that
includes the Shia militia. And I think everybody in that -- without going
into details of presidential conversations -- everybody understands that
the Mahdi Army and Sadr have to be dealt with.

What was your third part of your question?

Q And do you envision the partnership between U.S. and Iraqi forces leading
U.S. troops to be up against --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He has said that the commander will be free
to go after those who act outside the law wherever they are in Baghdad.
Maliki has made that very clear. That would include Sadr City.

Obviously, the whole premise of this, as I've described, is Iraqis in the
front and we in support. And that model applies everywhere in the city,
including Sadr City. Obviously, the details of where you start, how you do
it, what's the order of the neighborhoods, how do you deal with an issue of
Sadr City, that's something our commanders, Iraqi and U.S., are going to
have to work out.

Q But could it theoretically envision or include U.S. troops being --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let's not do hypotheticals. I can't be any
more clear. We've got an operational concept, it's going to apply through
the whole city --

Q But in principle, it could.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- we're going to have to see how it goes.

Q But in principle, it could.

Q In Amman, the President was very clear that Prime Minister Maliki was the
man for the job in Iraq. Is the President going --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me just say one other thing -- I'm
trying to -- on Robin's question. One of the things you've heard from
Maliki is he feels it's very important that Iraqis be in the lead,
particularly on the issue of militias. And so I think when you see that
issue, that's going to be one area in particular where the Iraqis are going
to want to be in the lead, with us in support.

I'm sorry.

Q That's okay. I'm just wondering what the President's -- what he will
express in the speech, specifically about Prime Minister Maliki, his
confidence in Maliki being the right man for the job, in the same way that
he expressed it very clearly in Amman, or has the President undergone
rethinking about the confidence level in Maliki?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He continues to think that Maliki is the
right man for the job; one, because he's the man that the Iraqis have put
in the job, but secondly, because he has had a number of exchanges -- Prime
Minister Maliki has been very clear to the President on what his intentions
are with the plan, very clear about these ground rules of rules of
engagement, to let this security plan work, let the Iraqi commander do the
job of bringing security everywhere in the city, operating without
political interference and continuing until the job is done. So again --
but he has also said to Prime Minister Maliki, this is the right plan,
these are the right words. Now we need to see you perform.

Q So does the speech implicitly put Prime Minister Maliki on notice?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think it makes it

-- calls it like it is, which is that they have a plan, they have good
statements, it's time to perform. And that's the message he's getting from
his own people, that's the message he's getting from the President, and
that's the message that he's getting from the American people.

Q What has changed in the last two months? Two months ago, the President
said we were winning, and now you're saying that the President made clear
the current status is not working. What is the single catalyst for that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think it's really what we've seen over
the last year. The big trigger was obviously going after the Golden -- the
bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samara. I think it's true that the Iraqis
did look into the abyss. Two months later, they did -- had a unity
government. The Iraqi security forces, particularly the army, did not
fracture.

But over the spring and summer, that sectarian violence did not abate, but
it continued to build. And I think it led people to conclude that what we
were doing wasn't working. And obviously, you don't want to declare a
strategy dead until you have a new one to put in its place.

And so -- and about two, three months ago, the President asked -- these
reviews started, very informally, and then, as you know, the President
asked they be brought together in an NSC system and done in a systematic
way. And he's been pretty public about that review over the last two or
three months.

Q And last question, how is the President going to justify to Congress the
additional need for troops?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: By explaining the problem, emphasizing and
I think playing on the fact that most congressmen understand that we can't
afford to fail, that -- he will explain why this, as he will tonight, why
this is a plan that he believes will succeed and is most likely to succeed,
but that it requires the additional troops in order to be successful.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He's got someone waiting for him in the
Roosevelt Room. I'll pick up the baton.

Go ahead, Peter.

Q Your colleague just said that the Iraqis want to control security by the
end of the year. What are the prospects for that happening?

Q Background for this part?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, everything is still on background.
Again, it fits into the larger architecture of what the Iraqis have been
talking all along about doing, which is assuming primary responsibility for
combat operations. They already do it in three of the provinces.

And again, rather than trying to ask a prospective question, it's something
that we're going to work toward achieving. Because, Peter, what you're
asking me is, what's going to transpire in the next 10 months. I can't give
you a precise answer on it, but the whole -- the way this plan has been put
together is in such a way as to work with the Iraqis so that you get away
from some of the problems that rendered the Baghdad -- the first two
Baghdad plans ineffective, one of the key elements there being rules of
engagement that effectively tied the hands of those who are going after bad
actors within the city of Baghdad.

You also now have real responsibility on the part of the Iraqis, as we've
also been discussing. It is a democratically elected government that's
under pressure. The Iraqi people are tired of this, as well. And so there
is real pressure within Iraq, even though most of the violence -- sectarian
violence is focused around Baghdad, and virtually all of the violence
around Baghdad and Anbar; even though 14 provinces have very low levels of
violence, nine of them have less than one violent incident per day. It is
clear --

Q So is the assessment --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me just finish here. That has still had
-- even in those areas, the violence in Baghdad has had an effect on
confidence in the government, itself. This is a time where the Iraq
government has to demonstrate to the Iraqi people its own ability to do the
basics. And we are going to do what we can to support and assist it in that
effort.

Q He has said that they want to control their security by the end of the
year. We've heard this before. So there is no -- going into this, no
assessment on whether that's achievable?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Of course, there is. Absolutely. But I
don't know -- precisely how would you have me answer the question?

Q Well, I mean, you've been consulting --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, let me put it this way.

Q -- with the Iraqis. They've been telling you what they think their
capabilities are. Do you think they have that capability?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. We wouldn't be talking about this if
we didn't think they had the capability. Furthermore, there has been a
pretty clear assessment -- and you'll see this reflected in some of the
fact sheets that you will get -- in some of the problems with some of the
Iraqi military and some of the police force: absenteeism, those sorts of
problems. So there's been a very clear-eyed look at what it takes to make
it more professional. So there is training, there is embedding -- one of
the Baker-Hamilton commission recommendations was considerably more
embedding. And so what you're going to see is U.S. forces embedding deeper
down to the company level, so that you are going to be working on the real
basics, in terms of fitness and professionality and that sort of thing
within the forces.

So this is an effort where we're going to be working at much closer levels,
making sure that they're properly equipped -- Barry McCaffrey has talked
about that. So there are a whole lot of different pieces here. This is not
simply U.S. forces going in following the Iraqis. There are much more
determined efforts, in terms of training, coordination, development of
capability when it comes to logistics, communications, intelligence on the
part of the Iraqis; and also, again, underlined three times, the importance
of coming up with rules of engagement that are going to be consistent with
making it clear that the law applies to everybody, and furthermore, the
forces are going to be able to do the essential jobs, because you cannot
move on to complete the political business until you've taken care of the
security situation.

Q One more. Are any other countries adding to their forces levels there?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Other countries are going to be involved,
and the President will be -- he will not be talking about other countries'
military commitments, but it is clear that a very important part of what's
going on here is the continued engagement and involvement of other
countries in the region, because this, again, is the central front in the
war on terror, but there are important other considerations. And I think
people in the neighborhood increasingly understand the importance of a
successful Iraq.

Q -- are you talking about Iran and Syria?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The President will talk about Iran and
Syria, absolutely.

Q I was referring to the current coalition countries -- are any of --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Again, no announcements on anything like
that, and that's not part of the discussion.

Q Is there a specific request for additional funding from Congress in the
speech?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. But there are -- I think we've briefed
you a little bit -- there will be in the supplemental the incremental
funding necessary. That will be $5.6 on the military side. That will
include, I think, $414 million for provincial reconstruction teams. It will
include $350 million for the CERP program -- Commander's Emergency Response
Program -- and $400 million for quick response funds, which are also part
of the Department of State.

Q Can you address the premise that some lawmakers who have met with the
President about this plan are calling it the "last chance"? We've talked
about that in the briefing room, but now, more freely, can you address this
overall premise?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I think when you go into a planning
process like this, you focus on what are the problems and how do you
succeed. And that is the attitude. Now, part of succeeding here is making
sure that the Iraqi government stands up and does what its people want,
what it says it wants, and what the American people want. But I think uses
of terms like "last chance," they create a sense of brinkmanship that is
not constructive and I don't think reflects the way in which ones goes
about trying to address these problems.

Q Again, what compels the Iraqis to -- what happens if they don't meet the
benchmarks?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, you're going to have to ask them.
Again, you want us to talk about "what if," and the moment we talk about
that, everybody defaults to that position. That also tips your hands to
terrorists and others working in the country. We're simply not going to
talk about the "what if" scenario.

Q Sure, but in a country that is tired of listening to, the Iraqis are
going to do this, and they never make it there --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, here's -- but you're going to have to
-- you're going to have some opportunities to judge very quickly. The
Iraqis are going to have three brigades within Baghdad within a little more
than a month. They have committed to trying to get one brigade in, I think,
by the first of February, and two more by the 15th. When it comes to
benchmarks, they are talking about, in a fairly short span of time,
addressing some of the key legislative business, including the hydrocarbon
law, de-Baathification reforms, and election/constitutional reforms.

So people are going to be able to see pretty quickly that the Iraqis are or
are not stepping up. And that provides the ability to judge.

Q The senior administration official was talking about two brigades in
Anbar Province and five in Baghdad. Are we talking about 14,000 --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, what we're talking about is --
actually, it's two Marine battalions in Anbar, which comes to 4,000 troops,
five army brigades in Baghdad. Together, you total them up, it's somewhere
in the 21,000-22,000 total.

Q Can you talk about the jobs program? The senior administration official
had mentioned a $10-billion effort for Iraqi jobs. I'm assuming that's
Iraqi money.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That is Iraqi money. The Prime Minister, in
his speech last week, they took $10 billion out of the $11 billion that
they have in spendable surplus funds, and they've committed that to a
reconstruction program that the Prime Minister announced last week.

Q And then the senior administration official said that we can complement
that. What does that mean? Does that mean that the $1 billion, in terms of
our own, creating another --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Keep in mind -- the other thing is that
other countries in the neighborhood, as part of the Iraq Compact -- and
it's worth mentioning this -- they're hoping that within the next few
weeks, they'll also be able to conclude work on the Iraq Compact, which
includes commitments by the U.N. -- U.N. member states and people in the
neighborhood also to make commitments when it comes to contributions within
Iraq. So those negotiations are moving very rapidly toward a point of
conclusion. So do not assume that each and every bit of funding that's
going to be expended on reconstruction is U.S. or Iraqi. There are going to
be others contributing to that effort.

If you take a look at the provincial reconstruction teams, and also now
what we're calling provincial support teams, which will be, essentially,
provincial reconstruction teams embedded within some of the combat units --
those are going to be efforts to help train Iraqis in everything from
building to putting in place the basics for civil society -- rule of law,
court system, that kind of thing. So a lot of those efforts are sort of
ongoing. And when we get these fact sheets out to you today, you'll be able
to see a little more of that detail.

Q So is that part of the billion-dollar plan that people are talking about
--

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, what people -- the best I can tell is
when people are using the billion-dollar figure, what they are doing is
that they are aggregating the accounts that I mentioned before, which would
be the provincial reconstruction team money, the CERP money, and also the
quick response funds. You put that together, that's in excess of a billion
dollars. Those are different accounts, but they tend to be used. And what
you're going to see is a much more coordinated effort to use DOD folks out
in the provinces, as well as civilian and state folks working out in the
provinces to try to develop greater capabilities on the part of local
governments and individuals.

Q What does he have to say specifically about Iran and Syria and the talk
of a new diplomatic offensive which the Baker-Hamilton proposed --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There is nothing about a new diplomatic
offensive. What it does is it makes it clear to Iran and Syria the
importance of playing constructive roles.

Q Let me follow on Suzanne's question. So what you're saying is the
President is going to call for boosting the U.S. reconstruction commitment
by more than a billion dollars?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Again, I think what you're talking about is
-- if you want to aggregate it that way, your answer is, yes. But I would
caution you that this reconstruction effort -- and this is -- General
Petraeus has written within the last month a handbook on counterinsurgency.
Part of counterinsurgency is not merely doing the military operations, but
also confidence-building in provinces. And what we're talking about here is
primarily beefing up in the four most dangerous provinces outside of
Baghdad -- or the four most violent provinces -- greater capability for
locals to be able to deal with civil affairs, which include the capacity
for building businesses and getting schools operating properly and doing
that. So it's not merely construction, but it really is kind of the nuts
and bolts also of getting the civil institutions in shape.

Q Is there a micro loan program in there, as well?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You know what, you're going to have to ask
the guys who are doing the line item stuff.

Q Do you have an overall cost estimate to this whole package?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I've just given it to you.

Q No, I'm talking about the military --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The military piece is $5.6 billion.

Q I thought that was just the down payment that's going to be in the
supplemental.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, that's in the supplemental -- you
understand -- I think the question you have -- I've got to go in a couple
of minutes -- you're asking a question that anticipates my knowing exactly
when everything is over. I don't.

Q Well, is there any end point to the mission for these additional troops?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We'll find out. I mean, the end point is,
we hope that we're going to have -- let me put it this way: You have the
mission, and the mission right now is you deal with the security problems,
you create breathing space so that the political institutions can continue
that business of doing national reconciliation and also addressing very
important fundamental needs, whether it be infrastructure in places like
Baghdad and other major urban areas, or continuing the business of building
civil institutions and economic capacity out in the provinces. All of those
things are the things that we're talking about.

Q How does the embedding work, in terms of who gets to decide where these
troops go? And the question of Sadr City came up. Is that an Iraqi
decision, yes, we're going to take on Sadr City and the Americans follow
along? Do the Americans make that decision? Who decides --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the Iraqis are going to be in the
lead here, and the United States in support roles, as the senior
administration official said.

Q -- that the Iraqi commanders could essentially commit U.S. troops --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, U.S. troops, again, will be working
under U.S. command and they will be working jointly. There is not going to
be an opportunity for Iraqis to be giving direct orders to the United
States.

Q But if Iraqis have tried to take on Sadr City, and U.S. troops are
embedded, does that mean U.S. troops --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You're confusing a couple of things also.
Just because you have embedded forces and you're doing training does not
mean that everybody sort of trails along on each and every mission. As the
senior administration official said, of particular interest for the Iraqis
is taking the lead in places like Sadr City.

Two more, and then I've got to go.

Q Will the benchmarks in the President's plan be associated with dates? And
what's the span under which those --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, but the benchmarks are the ones that
the Iraqis themselves have set. What he's saying is -- to the Prime
Minister, you have set your benchmarks, you need to meet them.

Q Will he say --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, I believe so. If not, our supporting
materials all do.

Q After the American people hear the speech or absorb it, will the
President be saying that with this plan there is increased risk, expect
more casualties, that will happen?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think -- it is certainly a
possibility. Common sense would dictate, especially if you're going into
areas where you have a dug-in enemy and you're saying, we're going to take
you on now, there is a real possibility of -- in the short run -- more
violence. We do not want people to think that the enemy simply is going to
run away. This is going to be a time where Iraqi and U.S. forces are going
very seriously after those who have tried to destabilize the democracy --
Al Qaeda in Anbar, a variety of different groups and organizations within
Baghdad proper. So we are certainly

-- we're going to acknowledge the fact that this creates a prospect of
greater violence in the short run.

Q The President, himself, is not going to measure success based on
increased violence that may occur, and he doesn't want the American people
to do that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, but I think -- what ultimately --
you've got a whole series of things. First, let's take a look at Iraqi
commitments and fulfilling those. Let's take a look, also, at what happens
on the civil front. Then you're going to have to take a look at the fact
that knowing that there is likely going to be some increased violence in
the short run, are we going to lead to the point where you end up subduing
those who are committing acts of violence, and at the same time, forcing
those who might either be inclined not to play active roles in supporting
the government, or might be inclined to try to go along with the bad actors
-- have them -- force them to make a choice.

That has been part of the calculus all along. But the problem is, there has
not been consequence for bad behavior in many cases, and now there has to
be consequences, and those consequences have to be clear, and they have to
be clear enough that people are going to make decisions on their own about
which path they're going to pursue.

In many cases, the failure to provide security within Baghdad encouraged
people to make their own deals -- either to say, we think this militia is
going to be more effective, we think this criminal band is going to be
effective, this group of rejectionists -- they're going to protect me. That
is an unacceptable situation. Ultimately, it is absolutely essential to
build the confidence in the security forces, including the police, so that
people will make the choice to support the government, rather than to cast
their lot with those who are actively undermining.

Q To clarify, what is "short run"?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What do you mean short run?

Q In the President's mind?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, what is short run in your mind? It's
one of those --

Q It doesn't make any difference to me. The American people -- said they're
skeptical, there's lack of patience.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Right. And the President is going to talk
about that. But if you're trying to define a term that vague, I think it's
less useful. What's going to be primarily useful -- and again, I apologize
--

Q He's Commander-in-Chief. He has to have a --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me finish the answer, and then I hope
it will be useful to you. The fact is there is not going to be a fact sheet
that says "the definition of short run is." We're already telling you that
on February 1st we expect there to be a brigade, an Iraqi brigade in
Baghdad, and two more by the 15th. You can expect to see operations.

As a matter of fact, you've already seen in recent days stepped up activity
led by the Iraqis within Baghdad. And that's the kind of thing you're going
to need to see. So I think what you're asking -- I honestly don't know how
to answer the question because, to me, it's less on point than, what does
the President propose to do, how does he see these pieces fitting together.
And it's really answering the questions, why do you think it's different
this time around; how do you expect it to work -- these are questions that
we're going to be getting a lot of.

I apologize. I've got to get going here in a minute. But let me make a
couple of points to everybody, and you can feel free to contact us during
the course of the day because we want to be as helpful as possible. We'll
get fact sheets out because we've really scratched the surface of a lot of
things that are going on.

Let me just back up to what my colleague did at the beginning. There has
been a long process of taking a very hard look and looking at each and
every alternative -- every alternative -- and people have spent a lot of
time looking through them. And they've come up with a comprehensive plan
that deals with a lot of different elements of the situation in Iran [sic],
including regionally, locally, economically, diplomatically and so on --
sorry, Iraq. Thank you. And as a consequence there's going to be a lot to
chew on when you do get these sheets. And I'm sorry they're not ready yet.

Last one.

Q Is this a rejection of the Iraq Study Group's report?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. As a matter of fact, you're going to
find that an enormous percentage of what the Iraq Study Group has proposed
is in here. Just giving you, for instance the notion of embedding -- as a
matter of fact, it was interesting, because there was apparently rejected
in -- or changed in a very late draft of the Iraq Study Group report
something that said, we think you ought to -- a lot of the things in terms
of embedding and doing these things may require increases in troops to be
effective.

So I think you're going to find that -- as a matter of fact, we should have
something available soon that matches up a lot of the ISG stuff. A lot of
that is reflected -- as a matter of fact, a lot of the comments and a lot
of the suggestions people have made have been incorporated into this report
and we have valued a lot of the input.

I apologize, I have another obligation I have to meet. Feel free to call
and get in touch with us and we'll get stuff to you soon.

Q How long is it? How long is the --

Q Wi